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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JO ANN BROOKS (NUNLEY), ) 
Plaintiff, Appellee, ) Case No, 920733-CA 
and Cross-Appellant, ) 
) District Court No. 880904192 
vs . ) 
) Priority No. 15 
THOMAS M. BROOKS, ) 
Defendant, Appellant, ) 
and Cross-Appellee. ) 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
AND CROSS-APPELLANT 
JOANN NUNLEY 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals is authorized by Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(2)(i) (1992) and Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 3 and 4 to 
hear this appeal (domestic relations case) from the Third Judicial 
District Court. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from an Order Modifying a Decree of Divorce, 
entered October 2, 1992. (Record at 1068-1075). Defendant filed his 
Notice of Appeal on November 2, 1992 (Record at 1099-1100), and 
Plaintiff filed her Notice of Cross-Appeal on November 13, 1992. 
(Record at 1106-07). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The following issues are raised on appeal and on cross-appeal: 
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by modifying 
the Decree of Divorce to require Defendant to pay one-half of the 
minor child's private school expenses, and to enter judgment against 
him for one-half of such expenses previously incuirred. The trial 
court's modification determination is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. Muir v. Muir, 841 P.2d 736, 739 (Utah App. 1992); Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-45-7 (1992). 
2. Whether the trial court erred or abused its discretion in 
refusing to allow Defendant credit toward his obligation to pay one-
half of Michelle's private school expenses for amounts she receives 
from Social Security as a result of his disability. Under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 407(a), the trial court's ruling is reviewed for correction of 
error. Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Bd., 409 U.S. 413, 93 S. 
Ct. 590 (1973); Mask v. Maskf 620 P.2d 883 (N.M. 1980). In contrast, 
if Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(8)(a) is applicable, the court's ruling 
is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Utah Code Ann. § 7 8-45-
7.5(8)(a). 
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing 
Plaintiff to submit evidence after the conclusion of trial to 
establish amounts claimed and sought at trial. The trial court's 
determination is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Utah R. Civ. P. 
43(b); Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc. v. Chavez, 565 P.2d 1142, 1143 
(Utah 1977) . 
4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing 
to modify the Divorce Decree to require Defendant to pay an increased 
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amount of child support. The trial court's decision to modify a 
divorce decree will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. 
Hagan v. Haaan, 810 P.2d 478, 481 (Utah App. 1991) (citing Jense v. 
Jense, 784 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah App. 1989)). 
5. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing 
to impute additional income to Defendant based upon his past-earnings 
history and lifestyle. The trial court's determination is reviewed 
for abuse of discretion. Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472, 480 
(Utah App. 1991) (quoting Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P.2d 1055, 1056 (Utah 
App. 1987)). 
6. Whether the trial court erred by refusing to adjust 
Defendant's tax-free income to reflect — for purposes of child 
support calculation — a gross income equivalent to a taxable income. 
The trial court's refusal to adjust Defendant's income is reviewed 
for correction of error. See Redevelopment Agency of Roy v. Jones, 
743 P.2d 1233, 1235 (Utah App. 1987). 
7. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting 
Defendant's medical testimony without any expert testimony or medical 
foundation. The trial court's decision to admit Defendant's 
testimony is reviewed for abuse of discretion. GAW v. State ex re 
Dep't of Trans., 798 P.2d 1130, 1134 (Utah App. 1990). 
8. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in entering 
judgment against Plaintiff for one-half the costs of transportation 
for Defendant's visitation with the minor child from and after the 
date of filing of the amended petition to modify the Decree of 
Divorce. The trial court's modification determination is reviewed 
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for abuse of discretion. Muir v. Muir, 841 P.2d 736, 739 (Utah App. 
1992); Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7 (1992). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
Title 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) provides: 
The right of any person to any future payment 
under this subchapter shall not be transferable 
or assignable, at law or in equity, and none of 
the moneys paid or payable or rights existing 
under this subchapter shall be subject to 
execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or 
other legal process, or to the operation of any 
bankruptcy or insolvency law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3). Disposition of property - Maintenance 
and health care of parties and children - Division of debts - Court 
to have continuing jurisdiction - Custody and visitation -
Termination of alimony - Nonmeritorious petition for modification. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to 
make subsequent changes or new orders for the 
support and maintenance of the parties, the 
custody of the children and their support, 
maintenance, health, and dental care, or the 
distribution of the property and obligations for 
debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7. Determination of amount of support -
Rebuttable guidelines. 
(1) Prospective support shall be equal to the 
amount granted by prior court order unless there 
has been a material change or circumstance on 
the part of the obligor or obligee. 
(2) If the court finds sufficient evidence to 
rebut the guidelines, the court shall establish 
support after considering all relevant factors, 
including but not limited to: 
(a) the standard of living and situation of the 
parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the child; 
(f) the ages of the parties; and 
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(g) the responsibilities of the obligor and the obligee 
for the support of others. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5. Determination of gross income - Imputed 
income^ 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. The parties were divorced in the State of 
California in August 1985. Plaintiff petitioned for modification of 
the foreign Divorce Decree on June 27, 1988, and then filed an 
Amended Petition on November 25, 1988. The Amended Petition alleged, 
among other things, that: (1) the Decree required Defendant, based 
upon his monthly net income of $1,600.00, to pay $300.00 child 
support per month; (2) the Decree was silent with respect to payment 
of the minor child's private-school tuition and expenses; (3) the 
expenses associated with raising the minor child had increased since 
the Decree due to the effects of inflation and cost of living 
increases as well as the increased age and needs of the minor child; 
(4) Plaintiff can no longer afford to carry the entire burden of 
paying for the minor child's private-school tuition and expenses. 
Plaintiff requested that the court order Defendant to pay for 
one-half of the minor child's private-school tuition and expenses. 
In addition, Plaintiff requested that the court order Defendant to 
pay increased child support commensurate with the applicable child 
support guidelines as well as visitation transportation expenses and 
extracurricular expenses incurred on behalf of the minor child. 
Disposition in the Lower Court. After trial on April 22, 1991, 
the trial court, in its April 26, 1991 Minute Entry, found, based on 
the substantial change of circumstances that had occurred, that it 
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was reasonable for both parties to share equally in the cost of 
transportation for the minor child's visitation with Defendant, and 
that Plaintiff reimburse Defendant for one-half of the transportation 
costs reasonably incurred in exercising his visitation rights with 
the minor child. The court found that there had not been a 
substantial change of circumstances to justify an increase in child 
support. In addition, the court found, based on the parties' desire 
of to maintain the minor child in private school, that each party 
should pay one-half of the tuition, books, supplies, school 
activities, and school uniforms, including arrearages. The court 
allowed Defendant to offset his obligation to pay one-half of the 
private school expenses with the minor child's Social Security 
benefits received as a result of Defendant's disability. 
Plaintiff then filed a motion for clarification of divorce 
modification issues, to which Defendant objected. After a hearing on 
the motion, the trial court allowed Plaintiff to file a motion to 
amend, together with any supporting memoranda. The court allowed 
Defendant thirty days to respond. After submissions by the parties, 
the court, reversed it ruling allowing Defendant a credit for his 
obligation to pay one-half of the visitation transportation expenses 
against the minor child's Social Security benefits. Defendant filed 
Notice of Appeal on November 2, 1992. Plaintiff filed Notice of 
Cross-Appeal on November 13, 1992. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff and Defendant were divorced in Los Angeles, California 
in August 1985. The California Decree of Divorce awarded the parties 
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joint legal and physical custody of the parties' minor child, 
Michelle, born September 18, 1980, with Plaintiff having primary 
physical custody. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 14 and Trial Transcript p. 
4). 
1. The original Decree ordered Defendant, based upon his net 
monthly income of $1600.00, to pay $300.00 per month child support. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 14). 
2. The original Decree ordered Plaintiff to provide expenses 
for the transportation of the minor child to and from Los Angeles for 
visitation with Defendant. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 14). 
3. Plaintiff petitioned the court for Modification of the 
foreign Decree on or about June 27, 1988. (Record at 2-10). In her 
petition, Plaintiff requested, based on a substantial change in 
circumstances, that she no longer be obligated to pay visitation 
transportation costs for the minor child from Salt Lake City to Los 
Angeles. (Record at 2-10). Plaintiff alleged the following 
substantial change in circumstances: (1) Defendant had moved from 
Los Angeles to Montana, since the Decree (2) there were no TWA 
flights1 between Salt Lake City and Montana, (3) and Defendant no 
longer resided in the "family home." (Record at 2-10). 
4. On or about August 11, 1988, Defendant filed an Answer to 
Plaintiff's Petition and filed a Counter Motion. (Record at 15-20). 
5. On or about November 23, 1988, pursuant to stipulation, 
Plaintiff filed her First Amended Petition for Modification of 
Foreign Divorce Decree. (Record at 44). In addition to Plaintiff's 
1
 Plaintiff was an employee of TWA and received free and/or 
discounted air travel. 
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request regarding the transportation issue, Plaintiff sought a 
modification requiring Defendant to pay one-half of the minor child's 
medical and dental expenses, including insurance premiums, one-half 
of the minor child's private school tuition, costs, and expenses, as 
well as an increase in child support. (Record at 34-43). 
6. The matter came on for trial on April 22, 1991. (Record at 
218) . 
7. At the time the parties were divorced in 1985, Defendant 
had retired from the Los Angeles Police Department, (Record at 1196), 
with a net income of $1600.00 per month. (Record at 1055). At the 
same time, Plaintiff was employed by TWA with a gross income of 
$28,687.24. (Record at 1164). 
8. At trial, Defendant testified that he had disability 
pension income of $2322.26 per month from his Los Angeles City 
Pension Plan and $697.00 per month in Social Security disability 
benefits. (See Defendant's Exhibit 6). 
9. Plaintiff testified that her employment with TWA terminated 
in June 1989. (Record at 1126-34). At the time of trial, Plaintiff 
was self-employed in the business of, designing, manufacturing, and 
distributing costumes in the business name of Nunley, Inc. (Record 
at 1128). From 1989-91, Plaintiff did not take a salary from the 
company, with the exception of $2000.00 in 1989 used to pay for the 
minor child's tuition at Rowland Hall St. Mark's private school. All 
other monies received by Plaintiff were reimbursements for expenses 
incurred on behalf of the corporation. (Record at 1129). At trial, 
Plaintiff stipulated that her income was $800.00 per month. (Record 
at 1130) . 
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10. Plaintiff presented evidence that Defendant owned a 
$53,000.00 Ferrari sports car (See Plaintiff's Exhibit 8), a ranch in 
Montana (See Plaintiff's Exhibit 9), and deposits of $173,650.58 
deposited into Defendant's checking account from May 16, 1988 through 
July 17, 1990. 
11. Plaintiff also presented evidence of Defendant's earning 
history (See Plaintiff's Exhibit 3) and extensive employment 
activities since obtaining his disability in 1984. (See Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 14) . 
12. It was established that Plaintiff was receiving Social 
Security benefits for and on behalf of the minor child, Michelle. 
(Record at 1168). Plaintiff testified that the amounts received were 
being put into a savings account for the minor child because of a 
concern, based upon an interview with a person from Social Security, 
that if it were shown that Defendant was fraudulently receiving 
benefits, all the monies would have to be repaid to the Social 
Security Administration. (Record at 1172-74). 
13. During their marriage, the parties sent the minor child to 
Westchester Lutheran School private school in California. (Record at 
1135). After moving to Salt Lake City following the divorce, 
Plaintiff enrolled the minor child at Rowland Hall-St. Mark's private 
school. 
14. Plaintiff believed, based upon numerous facts shown at 
trial, that it was Defendant's desired to have the minor child attend 
a private school. (Record at 1135-39). Further, in prior court 
proceedings, approximately one year following the divorce, Defendant 
expressed a desire that the minor child remain in private school, and 
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he indicated deep concerns that Plaintiff might be taking the minor 
child out of private school and placing her in public school. (See 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 6 and Record at 1235-39). At trial, Defendant 
admitted that '• [he] had always wanted Michelle to remain in private 
school, if possible." (Record at 1237). 
15. Following trial, on or about April 26, 1991, the court 
entered its Minute Entry (Record at 221-27) and ruled as follows: 
a. After expressing concern that neither of the parties 
had accurately revealed his or her income, the court, 
based on the evidence, found that Plaintiff's current 
monthly income was $800.00, and that Defendant's 
current monthly income was $3029.26. The court denied 
Plaintiff's reguest for increased child support, 
finding that there had not been substantial change of 
circumstances to justify an increase, and that the 
$300.00 provided the original Decree was in excess of 
the guidelines, and that Defendant had agreed that he 
would not pay less than $300.00 per month child 
support. 
b. The court, with respect to the visitation 
transportation expenses, found a sufficient change of 
circumstances to modify the Decree, based in part on 
Plaintiff's change of employment2, and that Defendant 
had moved from Los Angeles to Montana, which 
2
 Due to Plaintiff's termination of her employment with TWA she 
could no longer provide free and/or reduced rate airfare for the 
minor child. 
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technically terminated Plaintiff's obligation under 
the Decree. The court ordered that the parties share 
equally in the cost of visitation transportation for 
the minor child, and ordered Plaintiff to reimburse 
Defendant for one-half the visitation transportation 
reasonably incurred. 
c. After finding that it was the desire of Plaintiff and 
Defendant to maintain the minor child in private 
school. Therefore, the court ordered each party to 
pay one-half of the private school tuition, books, 
supplies, school activities, and school uniforms for 
the minor child. This obligation does not extend to 
the minor child's extracurricular activities. The 
court ruled that the amount being paid by Social 
Security to Plaintiff on behalf of the minor child 
should be applied against Defendant's obligation to 
pay one-half the private school expenses. The court 
ordered that judgment be entered against Defendant for 
the past private school expenses incurred by 
Plaintiff. 
d. Each party was ordered to pay their own attorney fees. 
16. On or about June 6, 1991, Plaintiff filed a Motion for 
Clarification of Ruling and In-Camera Interview. Plaintiff's Motion 
stated that the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law proposed by 
Defendant's counsel did not conform with the court's Minute Entry. 
The motion further stated there were certain issues that needed to be 
clarified, and that due to the fact that the parties were unable to 
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communicate with respect to the minor child's summer visitation, the 
court should conduct an in-camera interview with the child, (Record 
at 292-94). 
17. Defendant filed an Answer to Plaintiff's Motion for 
Clarification and In Camera Interview on or about June 10, 1991. 
Defendant included a Countermotion for attorney fees. (Record at 
302-05). 
18. Plaintiff filed a Response to Defendant's Countermotion for 
Attorney's Fees on or about June 17, 1991, arguing that Defendant 
should not be awarded attorney fees because Plaintiff's Motion was a 
simple request and did not require Defendant to file a lengthy 
response. (Record at 306-08). 
19. Plaintiff's Motion for Clarification came on for hearing 
August 7, 1991. (See Transcript of hearing at Record pp. 419-82). 
20. The trial court ordered Plaintiff to submit a motion or 
brief, pursuant to Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Jud. Admin., on the 
following issues: 
a. Whether or not it was appropriate for the court to 
apply the minor child's Social Security benefits to 
Defendant's obligation to pay one-half the private 
school expenses. (Record at 459-60). 
b. The amounts paid by Plaintiff for tuition, books, 
supplies, activities, and uniforms for private school 
for the minor child to be reimbursed by Defendant. 
(Record at 469-71). 
c. The court found it had failed to address Plaintiff's 
claim for one-half of medical and dental expenses 
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incurred on behalf of the minor child. The trial 
court directed Plaintiff to submit the amounts paid 
for medical and dental expenses for the minor child to 
determine the amount to be reimbursed by Defendant. 
(Record at 474-76). 
21. Plaintiff's counsel was to file the motion / brief and 
Defendant's counsel was given thirty (30) days to respond. (Record 
at 357). 
22. On or about September 16, 1991, Defendant filed a Motion to 
Strike Plaintiff's Reserved Issues from Motion for Clarification, 
Sanctions, and Attorney Fees, stating that Plaintiff had failed to 
timely file her motion. (Record at 376-379). The trial court denied 
the motion on or about November 8, 1991. 
23. Consistent with the trial court's August 7, 1991 ruling, 
Plaintiff filed her Motion for Post-Trial Determination of Divorce 
Modification Issues on or about November 1, 1991. (Record at 527-
731). In support of her position that the court should not use the 
minor child's Social Security benefits to meet the obligations of her 
father, Plaintiff submitted a letter from the Social Security 
Administration and cited statutory and case law. Plaintiff also 
submitted, in affidavit form, the amounts expended on behalf of the 
minor child for private school and medical and dental expenses. 
24. On or about December 6, 1991, Defendant filed his 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Post-Trial 
Determination of Divorce Modification Issues. (Record 747-53). 
Defendant filed a supplement to his primary Memorandum in opposition 
on December 16, 1991 (Record at 777) and then filed an "Answer" to 
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Plaintiff's Motion for Post-Trial Determination and in Support of his 
Motion for Attorney Fees on December 17, 1991 (Record at 780). 
25 Plaintiff filed Motions to Strike Defendant's Supplement 
and "Answer" (Record at 759 and 788). The court granted Plaintiff's 
Motions. (Record at 798). 
26. In its December 19, 1991 Minute Entry, the court granted 
Plaintiff's Motion for Post-Trial Determination of Modification 
Issues pursuant to Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Jud. Admin. (Record at 
796). The court vacated the April 26, 1991, ruling granting 
Defendant a credit for amounts paid to the minor child by Social 
Security. The court also granted judgments against Defendant in the 
amount of $13,360.75 for one-half the private school costs and 
expenses and $805.23 for one-half the medical and dental expenses of 
the minor child. 
27. Defendant filed a Motion for Ruling on Omitted Issues, 
Motion for Evidentiary Hearing and Argument of Court's Minute Entry, 
Motion for New Trial and Other Related Matters on or about December 
31, 1991. (Record at 800-12). 
28. On or about January 9, 1992, Plaintiff filed an Opposition 
to Defendant's Motion for Ruling on Omitted Issues, Motion for 
Evidentiary Hearing and Argument on Court's Minute Entry, Motion for 
a New Trial and Other Related Matters. (Record at 813-23). 
29. On or about January 10, 1992, Defendant filed a Motion to 
Amend Judgment, and in the Alternative, for Relief from Judgment or 
Order. (Record at 824-27). Defendant also filed an objection to the 
Plaintiff's proposed Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Post-Trial 
Determination (Record at 828) and a motion for oral argument (Record 
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at 832), Plaintiff filed objections to Defendant's motions. (Record 
at 839-49). The court denied Defendant's motions in it Minute Entry 
dated January 21, 1992. (Record at 850-52). 
30. Each party prepared proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and Order Modifying Decree of Divorce, and each party 
objected to the other's proposed documents. (Record at 878). On or 
about March 9, 1992, the court heard oral arguments on the 
objections. (A copy of the transcript is found in the same bound 
volume as the Trial Transcript.) The parties agreed to discuss an 
accounting of amounts due under the court's ruling and then submit 
those amounts to the court for ruling. (March 9, 1992, hearing 
transcript pp. 46-47 and Record at 911). 
31. Defendant filed an accounting which included amounts that 
the parties had agreed were due under the court's ruling as well as 
his objections to other amounts which had been submitted by 
Plaintiff. (Record at 918-88). Plaintiff filed a response and 
objection to Defendant's accounting, setting forth the amounts agreed 
to and then argument in support of the other amounts that should be 
included in the order. (Record at 989-1028). 
32. In its Minute Entry dated July 22, 1992, the court found 
that Defendant owed Plaintiff $8,312.75 for one-half the private 
school tuition and costs; $578.62 for one-half the medical and dental 
expenses of the minor child; and $2,900.69 for uniforms, school 
activities, and school supplies. (Record at 1040). 
33. The court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order Modifying Decree of Divorce on October 2, 1992. (A copy of 
each is attached hereto as Exhibit A). 
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34. Defendant filed his Notice of Appeal on November 2, 1992. 
(Record at 1099) . 
35. Plaintiff filed her Notice of Cross-Appeal on November 13, 
1992. (Record at 1106). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by modifying the 
Decree of Divorce to require Defendant to pay one-half of the minor 
child's private school expenses, and to enter judgment against him 
for one-half of such expenses previously incurred. 
The trial court neither erred nor did it abuse it discretion in 
refusing to allow Defendant credit toward his obligation to pay one-
half of Michelle's private school expenses for amounts she receives 
from Social Security as a result of his disability. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing 
Plaintiff to submit evidence after the conclusion of trial to 
establish amounts claimed. 
The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to modify the 
Divorce Decree to require Defendant to pay an increased amount of 
child support. 
The trial court abused its discretion by refusing to impute 
additional income to Defendant based upon his past-earnings history 
and lifestyle. 
The trial court erred by refusing to adjust Defendant's tax-free 
income to reflect — for purposes of calculation of child support 
pursuant to the applicable child support guidelines — a gross income 
equivalent to a taxable income. 
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The trial court abused its discretion by admitting Defendant's 
medical testimony in evidence without any expert testimony or medical 
foundation. 
The trial court erred in entering judgment against Plaintiff for 
one-half the costs of transportation for Defendant's visitation with 
the minor child from and after the date of filing of the amended 
petition to modify the decree of divorce. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
MODIFYING THE DECREE OF DIVORCE TO REQUIRE 
DEFENDANT TO PAY ONE-HALF OF THE MINOR CHILD'S 
PRIVATE SCHOOL EXPENSES, AND TO ENTER JUDGMENT 
AGAINST HIM FOR ONE-HALF OF SUCH EXPENSES 
PREVIOUSLY INCURRED. 
The original California Decree of Divorce, entered on or about 
August 14, 1985, awarded the parties joint legal custody of the 
parties' minor child, Michelle, and awarded Plaintiff primary 
physical custody of Michelle. (Record at 1118 and Plaintiff's Exhibit 
6). By petition, June 27, 1988 (Record at 2), and by Amended 
Petition, November 23, 1988 (Record at 34), Plaintiff petitioned the 
court for modification of the Decree of Divorce, requesting, inter 
alia, that Defendant be required to pay one-half of the minor child's 
private school tuition and costs. (Record at 42). After thoroughly 
considering the issues, the court ordered Defendant to pay one-half 
of the minor child's private school expenses. (Record at 225). 
To obtain modification of a divorce decree, a party must show 
that there has been a substantial change in circumstances subsequent 
to the decree that was not contemplated in the original decree. 
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Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985) (per curiam); 
Muir v, Muir, 841 P.2d 736, 739 (Utah App. 1992); Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-45-7 (1992). Once such a showing has been made, the trial 
court's modification determination is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. Muir, 841 P.2d at 739.3 
On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court abused its 
discretion in modifying the Decree of Divorce to require him to pay 
one-half of the minor child's private school expenses. Defendant 
claims that the trial court did not specifically find that there had 
been a change of circumstances sufficient to warrant the 
modification. 
"In cases tried to the bench, the court is required to 'find the 
facts specially' and thus ground its decision on findings of fact 
which resolve the material factual uncertainties and are expressed in 
enough detail to enable a reviewing court to determine whether they 
are clearly erroneous." Erwin v. Erwinf 773 P.2d 847, 848-49 (Utah 
App. 1989) (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). A review of the findings 
is not limited to written findings, rather, the appellate court may 
view the "findings from various sources in the record." id. In 
order "to ensure the court acted within its discretion, the facts and 
reasons for the court's decision must be set forth fully in 
appropriate findings and conclusions." Painter v. Painter, 752 P.2d 
907, 909 (Utah App. 1988) (citations omitted); accord Linam v. King, 
804 P.2d 1235, 1237 (Utah App. 1991). Moreover, the findings must be 
3
 Because Defendant has failed to cite the standard of review 
as required by the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this Court 
should "assume the correctness of the trial court's judgment." 
Christensen v. Munns, 812 P.2d 69, 73 (Utah App. 1991). 
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adequate to ensure "'that the trial court's discretionary 
determination was rationally based.'" Painter, 752 P.2d at 909 
(quoting Martinez v. Martinez, 728 P.2d 994, 994 (Utah 1986)). 
Once the findings are deemed sufficiently detailed for appellate 
review, the appellate court gives "great deference to the trial 
court's findings of fact" and "will not overturn them unless they are 
clearly erroneous." Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465, 467 (Utah App. 
1989). Because of such deference given "to the trial court to judge 
the credibility of witnesses," this standard applies even when the 
findings are based on hotly disputed evidence. Id.; Utah R. Civ. P. 
52(a). "The trial court is best suited to assess the factors upon 
which it based its determination, given its proximity to the parties 
and circumstances, and its opportunity to personally observe and 
evaluate the witnesses." Myers v. Myers, 768 P. 2d 979, 984 (Utah 
App. 1989) (citing Alexander v. Alexander, 737 P.2d 221, 223 (Utah 
1987) ) . 
Although there is not a specific finding that there had been a 
substantial change in circumstances as to the private school expenses 
issue, the trial court's findings are sufficiently detailed to allow 
for appellate review. Furthermore, the findings and the record, 
taken as a whole, provide ample evidence for the trial court's 
determinations on the private school expenses issue. 
For example, in finding number four of the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, the trial court found that at the time of entry 
of the divorce decree in 1985, Plaintiff was employed with TWA 
Airlines with a gross monthly income of $2390.60, and that Defendant 
was receiving a disability net income of $1600.00 per month. (Record 
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at 1055). At the time of filing of her petition for modification, 
Plaintiff, who became self-employed in 1989, experienced over a 
sixty-five percent reduction in income. Based on stipulated 
testimony at trial, the court found that Plaintiff's income was 
approximately $833.00 per month. (Record at 1055). In contrast, the 
court found that, since the Decree, Defendant's tax free disability 
and Social Security income had increased over forty-five percent to 
$3029.26 gross per month.4 (Record at 1055). This substantial 
change of both parties' income, alone, warrants a conclusion that 
Defendant should, at the very least, be required to pay one-half of 
the minor child's private school expenses. 
In addition to the court's findings regarding the substantial 
change in income of the parties, the court found that Defendant 
claims a $400.00 per month expenditure to maintain his Ferrari sports 
car, and that Defendant, during a twenty-five month period, from May 
16, 1998 through July 17, 1990, deposited approximately $173,000.00 
into his checking account, which amounts to approximately $100,000.00 
of unexplained income that Defendant receives in excess of the tax-
free disability income of $3029.26 per month. (Record at 222-23, 
1056). Moreover, in making its findings, the court noted, 
explicitly, that Defendant received additional income that the court 
was unable to specifically identify. (Record 222-23, 1056). 
Another substantial change in circumstances has occurred since 
the original Decree, namely, the enrollment of the minor child in 
4
 Because Defendant's income is tax free, it is equivalent to 
a net income for purposes of comparison to his previously received 
income. 
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Rowland-Hall St. Mark's private school, which has reguired Plaintiff 
to expend substantial amounts of money. (Record at 1059). Prior to 
the divorce becoming final in 1985, the parties had been sending the 
minor child, Michelle, to Westchester Lutheran School, a private 
preschool located in California. (Record at 1135, lines 6-7; 1139, 
lines 17-19). The cost of the Westchester private preschool, which 
was approximately $300.00 per month, was substantially less than the 
post-Decree expenditures reguired to maintain the minor child in 
Rowland-Hall St. Mark's, which were approximately twice as much as 
Westchester. (Record at 548-657). 
Because the Decree of Divorce was premised on a stipulated 
agreement that has never been the subject of an objective appraisal 
on the merits (See Plaintiff's Exhibit 6), the changed-circumstances 
rule should be relaxed in the instant case. See Elmer v. Elmerr 77 6 
P.2d 599 (Utah 1989). Although Elmer was a modification of custody 
case, the spirit of the rule is applicable in cases such as this 
where an issue is being adjudicated for the first time. However, 
even if the Court determines that the changed-circumstances rule 
should not be relaxed in this case, the previously discussed 
substantial changes in circumstances support the trial court's 
determination concerning the private school. 
In his opening brief at pages 23-25, Defendant argues that the 
court's finding regarding his financial ability to pay "is contrary 
to the evidence and an abuse of discretion." Defendant, however, 
misperceives the standard for reviewing findings of fact and the 
underlying reasons why deference is given to the trial court's 
findings. Findings of fact are not reviewed for an abuse of 
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discretion, rather, they are overturned only if they are clearly 
erroneous. Notwithstanding Defendant's argument, a review of the 
record, together with the findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
reveal that the trial court thoroughly reviewed all the evidence 
concerning Defendant's ability to pay. (Record 1063, Finding of Fact 
30). In fact, Hardisty v. Hardisty, 439 A.2d 307 (Conn. 1981), which 
Defendant cites in support of his inability-to-pay argument, supports 
the trial court's determination in the instant case. Like the court 
in Hardisty, the trial court, after considering the totality of the 
circumstances, including Defendant's ability to pay, concluded that 
Defendant should be required to pay one-half of his daughter's 
private school expenses. See id. at 312;5 see also Utah Code Ann. 
§7 8-45-7(3) (outlining the relevant factors to be considered in 
establishing the support of others). 
Furthermore, in challenging the trial court's findings, 
Defendant fails to "marshal the evidence which supports the 
finding[s] and then demonstrate that, despite this evidence, [it is] 
clearly erroneous." Christensen v. Munns, 812 P. 2d 69, 73 (Utah App. 
1991); accord Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465 (Utah App. 1989). 
Instead, Defendant merely refers the Court to evidence that conflicts 
with the findings and supports his contention that he should not have 
to pay the private school tuition and expenses. Even if the Court 
5
 Although Hardisty supports the court's determination in the 
instant case, it is distinguishable from the instant case inasmuch 
as the noncustodial parent, who was being asked to contribute 
towards the private schooling of the parties' minor child, doubted 
the value of the private school's program and believed that the 
minor child's enrollment was unnecessary. Hardisty v. Hardistyf 
439 A.2d 307, 314 (Conn. 1981). 
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finds that Defendant sufficiently marshaled the evidence, the trial 
court's findings on the private school expenses issue are not clearly 
erroneous or against the clear weight of the evidence. 
In his brief, Defendant characterizes Plaintiff's decision to 
enroll the minor child in a private school as unilateral in nature. 
He argues that such a decision is contrary to the award of joint 
custody in the divorce decree. The record, however, reveals that 
prior to divorce, Plaintiff and Defendant agreed that the minor child 
should attend private school. (Record at 1138-39). This intent to 
have Michelle attend private school is evidenced by her enrollment, 
prior to the divorce, in Westchester Lutheran private preschool. 
(Record at 1135, lines 6-7; 1139, lines 17-19). Additionally, in his 
answer to Plaintiff's amended petition, Defendant admitted his desire 
that the minor child remain enrolled in a private school. (Record at 
55, parag. 11; see also Plaintiff's Exhibit 6, Declaration of Thomas 
M. Brooks, parag. 7, lines 11-19). In fact, in an order to show 
cause proceeding, initiated in California by Defendant prior to this 
Utah proceeding, Defendant, in the course of expressing his 
displeasure with plaintiff's caretaking abilities, alleged that 
Plaintiff had withdrawn Michelle from the private school she had been 
attending. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 6). Based on this evidence, the 
trial court specifically found that both the parties clearly desire 
that Michelle attend private school. (Record at 1059, Finding of 
Fact 18). 
Finally, Defendant fails to show how the trial court abused its 
discretion in requiring him to pay one-half of the private school 
expenses incurred prior to trial. The trial court, by virtue of its 
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broad equitable powers in domestic relations cases, see Harmon v. 
Harmon, 26 Utah 2d 436, 491 P.2d 231, 233 (1971); Thronson v. 
Thronson, 810 P.2d 428, 431 (Utah App. 1991), fashioned the award in 
a manner which it believed most equitable to the minor child and 
parties. The factors considered by the trial court were: (1) that 
Plaintiff had been paying the private school expenses since the 
divorce in 1985; (2) that the expenses for private school cost 
Plaintiff approximately $50,000.00; (3) that Defendant has the 
ability to pay at least one-half of Michelle's private school 
expenses; and (4) that both Plaintiff and Defendant desired that 
Michelle attend private school. 
Based on the foregoing, the trial court's findings support the 
determination that there were substantial changes in circumstances. 
Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring 
Defendant to pay one-half of the minor child's private school 
expenses. 
2. THE TRIAL COURT NEITHER ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW 
NOR DID IT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO 
ALLOW DEFENDANT TO OFFSET HIS OBLIGATION TO PAY 
ONE-HALF OF MICHELLEfS PRIVATE SCHOOL EXPENSES 
WITH HIS MINOR CHILD'S SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS. 
The trial court, in its April 26, 1991 minute entry, attempted 
to assign or transfer the minor child's Social Security benefits, 
received due to Defendant's disability, to satisfy Defendant's 
obligation for payment of private schooling expenses. (Record at 
225). By way of motion for clarification filed June 6, 1991, 
Plaintiff reguested that the trial court amend its judgment so as not 
to credit the minor child's Social Security benefits toward 
24 
Defendant's obligation. (Record 456-59). At the hearing on 
Plaintiff's motion, and after considering a letter submitted by 
Plaintiff from a Social Security Administration Official, the court 
directed Plaintiff to file a memorandum, either by way of Rule 4-501, 
Utah Code of Jud. Admin, or motion to amend, in support of her 
position on the Social Security benefits issue. (Record at 459). 
The court provided Defendant an opportunity to fully respond. 
(Record 459-60). After considering both parties' submissions, the 
trial court vacated its ruling allowing the minor child's disability 
benefits to be credited towards Defendant's obligation to pay one-
half of the minor child's private school expenses. (Record at 796). 
On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred as a 
matter of law in refusing to use his daughter's Social Security 
benefits to offset his obligations to his daughter. Defendant claims 
that the trial court erred in concluding that it did not have the 
authority to allow such a credit in favor of Defendant. Defendant's 
position is flawed. 
Title 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) provides: 
The right of any person to any future payment 
under this subchapter shall not be transferable 
or assignable, at law or in equity, and none of 
the moneys paid or payable or rights existing 
under this subchapter shall be subject to 
execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or 
other legal process, or to the operation of any 
bankruptcy or insolvency law. 
(Emphasis added.) After considering this portion of the code, the 
United States Supreme Court, in Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Bd.. 
409 U.S. 413, 93 S. Ct. 590 (1973), held that the language of 42 
U.S.C. § 407 is "all-inclusive." Id. at 415; 93 S. Ct. at 592. The 
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Court then ruled that § 407 "imposes a broad bar against the use of 
any legal process to reach all Social Security benefits." Id. at 
417; 93 S. Ct. at 592 (emphasis added). 
In Hennagin v. County of Yolof 481 F. Supp. 923 (E.D. Cal. 
1979), the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
California ruled that the father's support obligations could not be 
satisfied by reaching such benefits, and that state officials could 
not obtain such funds for reimbursement of AFDC benefits paid by the 
State to the children. In so ruling, the court stated: 
The Court adopts the position of the Social 
Security Administration, . . . that in instances 
where a parent is responsible for making court-
ordered support payments, such legal obligation 
cannot be discharged by denominating children's 
disability insurance benefits as "child support" 
from the parent. To reguire that the children's 
disability benefits here be credited toward 
their father's child support arrearages would 
indeed be ". . . ordering the children to pay 
the accrued arrearages for their own support." 
Id. at 924 (citations omitted). Further, in Mask v. Mask, 620 P.2d 
883 (N.M. 1980), the New Mexico Supreme Court stated: 
Federal regulations prohibit the custodial 
parent from recovering support arrearages out of 
social security payments. This should apply 
egually to the non-custodial parent who seeks to 
satisfy his support obligation by way of social 
security payments made directly from the social 
security administration to the child. These 
funds are the child's, and cannot be used to 
meet [the father's] obligations, as stated in 
Fuller v. Fuller, 306 N.E.2d 357, 358 (1976): 
The Social Security Act, Title 42, 
U.S. Code, Section 401 et seg., 
provides that every dependent child of 
an individual who is entitled to 
Social Security benefits shall be 
entitled to a child's insurance 
benefit. . . . We determine from this 
that the benefit inures directly to 
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the child, notwithstanding the 
prerequisite status of the parent. No 
indices of the father's ownership ever 
attached to these funds. Thus, the 
court is, in effect, ordering the 
children to pay the accrued arrearages 
for their own support. 
Id. at 886. Recognizing the inequities of allowing such credits, the 
court further stated: 
If we were to allow such credits, the defendant 
would receive a windfall, since the delinquent 
support payments would be made with the funds of 
the social security administration and not with 
his own. If we disallow the credits, the 
daughter will receive the benefits of the extra 
payments since she will receive not only the 
support arrearages but also the monthly social 
security checks. As between the two parties, we 
feel, as did the Missouri court in McClaskey, 
supra, 543 S.W.2d at 835, that "[w]hen the 
windfall comes, equitably it should inure not to 
the defaulting husband's benefit, but to his 
bereft children. 
Id. Finally, the court recognized that another reason equity 
requires that credits not be allowed in such situations is that the 
child's needs are current and not sometime in the future. Id. "To 
allow such credits would be to encourage fathers to put off making 
their support payments in the hope that some future collateral source 
would satisfy their arrearages." Id. 
Consistent with the language of § 407 and the previously stated 
case law, the Social Security Administration, Department of Health 
and Human Services, by way of letter July 12, 1991, stated that the 
Social Security benefits received by the minor child "may be 
considered as support, but this amount is for the child only, and not 
for any other purpose." (Record at 544; letter from Frances R. Darr, 
Social Security Administration). 
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In the instant case, the minor child, Michelle, is a direct 
recipient of Social Security benefits related to Defendant's 
disability. The benefits received by Michelle are independent of 
Defendant's benefits; Defendant receives no more or less by virtue of 
benefits received by Michelle. The benefits, consistent with 
statutory law and case law, are the property of the minor child, 
Michelle, not Defendant. See Mask, 620 P.2d at 886. As such, the 
benefits cannot and should not be used to meet Defendant's 
obligations to his minor child, Michelle. To allow such a credit 
would violate the principles of equity and would, in effect, be 
requiring Michelle to pay for her own schooling, and in turn, would 
be relieving Defendant of his responsibility to do so. Moreover, 
such a credit against Defendant's obligation would be inconsistent 
with the trial court's order that Defendant pay one-half of 
Michelle's private schooling expenses, especially in light of the 
court's specific findings concerning Defendant's desire to maintain 
Michelle in private school and his ability to pay. (Record at 1059, 
Finding of Fact 18; Record at 1063, Finding of Fact 30). 
Defendant, in his brief, cites United States v. Devalle, 704 
F.2d 1513 (11th Cir. 1983), for the proposition that 42 U.S.C. 
§ 407(a) is inapplicable when the basic needs of the debtor (i.e., 
the minor child in this case) are satisfied. Devalle, however, is 
distinguishable from the instant case because it involved 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1325(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, which specifically modifies the 
anti-assignment effect of 42 U.S.C. § 407, but only in bankruptcy 
cases. Id. at 1515 and 1518 ("We therefore find that the Bankruptcy 
Code must be construed to limit the anti-assignment provision of the 
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Social Security Act when the debtor voluntarily submits a Chapter 13 
plan."). Furthermore, nothing in Devalle indicates that the holding 
is applicable to a situation where a parent wants to apply his 
child's Social Security benefits to satisfy his obligation to support 
his child. 
In light of the plain language of 42 U.S.C. § 407, case law, and 
Social Security Administration policy, the trial court correctly held 
that it did not have the power to assign the Social Security benefits 
received by the parties' minor child to satisfy her father's 
obligation to pay one-half of her private school expenses. 
Assuming, arguendo, that § 407 is inapplicable to the instant 
case, the trial court, viewing the record as a whole and by virtue of 
its eguitable powers in domestic relations cases, did not abuse its 
discretion in ruling that Defendant could not receive such a credit. 
According to Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7 .5(8) (a), the trial court, under 
Utah law, "may" determine whether or not a credit is appropriate. 
In the instant case, the trial court initially granted Defendant 
to credit his obligation against the Social Security benefits of the 
minor child, Michelle, because it assumed Michelle was receiving 
Defendant's money, which is wrong. However, the court changed its 
position when it realized that Defendant's benefits were unaffected 
by Michelle's. In recognizing this distinction, the trial court 
stated: 
Now, just so that everybody understands, there 
was no doubt in my mind, that the reason I made 
that ruling was because I felt that the income 
to the child, that is this minor's beneficiaries 
or dependent's payment was, in effect, earned 
and supplied by the father. And I felt, without 
knowing, that it probably served to reduce at 
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least a portion of what he received. That no 
being the case, I do have some concerns about 
what I did on that part of [the ruling]. 
(Record at 460-61). The trial court, in the instant case, indicated 
the reasons for refusing Defendant a credit. First, the court 
recognized that the Social Security benefits received by the minor 
child belong to her, and as such, should not be used to meet her 
father's obligations. (Record at 1060, Finding of Fact 21). In 
other words, the minor child should not be required to foot the bill 
for her own education, especially in light of Defendant's desire that 
she attend a private school and his ability to pay. Second, 
Defendant should fulfill his obligations for one-half of the minor 
child's private school expenses from his own resources and not from 
the minor child's Social Security benefits. (Record at 1060, Finding 
of Fact 21). 
In Pontbriand v. Pontbriand, 622 A.2d 482 (R.I. 1993), a case 
relied upon by Defendant in his opening brief, the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court ruled that Social Security benefits paid to dependent 
children may be used to offset child support obligations of a 
noncustodial parent. Id. at 485. A distinguishing aspect of the 
Pontbriand court's ruling, however, is the fact that the noncustodial 
parent's monthly disability income was reduced by the total amount he 
and his dependents were receiving in Social Security benefits. Id. 
at 483-84. This is not the case here. As indicated by the letter 
from the Social Security Administration, which was submitted to the 
trial court, the Social Security benefits paid to the minor child, 
Michelle, do not reduce or diminish, by even one dollar, the amount 
received by Defendant as the primary beneficiary. (Record at 544, 
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letter from Frances R. Darr, Social Security Administration; Record 
at 460-61; Record at 756). To allow Defendant such a credit would 
require, in effect, the minor child to pay for her own education. 
Finally, by including the income of Plaintiff's husband, i.e., 
the stepparent of the minor child, Michelle, Defendant argues that 
the minor child's basic needs are met. Defendant, however, fails to 
recognize that, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-4.2, it is the 
natural parent's primary obligation to provide support for the minor 
child. By way of comparison between Plaintiff and Defendant, 
Defendant is clearly in the best position, economically, to provide 
support for Michelle. As the trial court specifically found, 
Defendant's monthly income is over $3029, tax free. Moreover, 
Defendant is single, Michelle being his only child. 
In light of principles of equity and fairness in the instant 
case, which the court duly considered prior to determining that 
Defendant should fulfill his obligations out of his own funds, the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to credit 
Defendant's obligation to pay one-half of private school expenses 
with his daughter's Social Security benefits. 
3. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
ALLOWING PLAINTIFF TO SUBMIT EVIDENCE AFTER THE 
CONCLUSION OF TRIAL TO ESTABLISH AMOUNTS CLAIMED 
AND SOUGHT AT TRIAL. 
On appeal, Defendant claims, pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 43(b), that the trial court abused its discretion by 
considering evidence after trial on the issues regarding the minor 
child's private school expenses and medical and dental expenses. In 
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so doing, Defendant fails to set forth the procedural posture leading 
to both the court's request and consideration of evidence, of which 
Defendant now complains. 
Following trial and the court's April 26, 1991 minute entry, 
Plaintiff filed a motion for clarification of the court's ruling. 
(Record at 292). In the motion, Plaintiff stated that disputes 
concerning the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law 
needed to be resolved, and that certain matters in the court's minute 
entry needed clarification. Following Defendant's response, the 
court, on August 7, 1991, held a hearing on the motion. (Record 419-
82). At the hearing, the trial court ordered Plaintiff to submit a 
motion to amend, pursuant to Utah Code of Jud. Admin. Rule 4-501, 
addressing the following: (1) whether Defendant should receive a 
credit for the minor child's Social Security benefits; (2) the amount 
of expenses paid by Plaintiff to maintain the minor child in private 
school; and (3) both the amount of the medical and dental expenses 
and transportation expenses paid for by Plaintiff. (Record at 292, 
459). In the process, the trial court did not provide a deadline for 
filing the motion (Record at 460, lines 5-8), but instead allowed for 
its filing at "any time;" the court allowed Defendant thirty days 
for response, rather than the Rule 4-501(1)(b) ten-day response time. 
(Record at 13-22). The court, in setting the thirty-day response 
time, sought to provide Defendant with the opportunity to take 
depositions and anything else in response. (Record at 459-60). 
Because of the large amount of information and time required to 
accumulate the information requested by the court, Plaintiff, on 
November 1, 1991, in accordance with the trial court's directive, 
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filed her Motion for Post-trial Determination of Divorce Modification 
Issues. (Record at 527-731). Defendant responded with his untimely 
memorandum in opposition on December 6, 1991, which was more than the 
thirty days granted by the court for response.6 (Record at 747-53). 
Defendant filed a Supplement on December 16, 1991 (Record at 777), 
and then he filed an "Answer" to the Plaintiff's "Motion for Post-
Trial Determination of Divorce Modification Issues" on December 17, 
1991. (Record at 780). Plaintiff filed motions to strike 
Defendant's untimely Supplement and Answer (Record at 759 and 788), 
which the court granted. (Record at 798). 
Rule 43(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states, "When a 
motion is based on facts not appearing of record the court may hear 
the matter on affidavits presented by the respective parties, but the 
court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral 
testimony or depositions." (Emphasis added). In addition, Utah Code 
of Jud. Admin. Rule 4-501(3), provides that a request for hearing 
"shall be granted unless the court finds that . . . the dispositive 
issue or set of issues governing the granting or denial of the motion 
has been authoritatively decided." 
As a threshold matter, the trial court had the authority to 
consider Plaintiff's motion under Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Although there is no provision in the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure for a motion to clarify, Plaintiff's request to obtain 
relief from and clarify the court's initial judgment was sufficient 
6
 Notwithstanding Defendant's untimely filing, the court 
considered Defendant's memorandum. (Record at 796). 
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to invoke relief under Rule 60(b)(7). See Kunzler v. O'Neil, 215 UAR 
57, 58-59 (Utah App. 1993). 
The trial court appropriately exercised its discretion by not 
holding an evidentiary hearing on the motion. The matters had been 
primarily and authoritatively decided by the court at trial. As 
indicated by the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial 
court laboriously considered the evidence and then ruled accordingly. 
Because the matters raised by the pleadings were decided based on 
both the extensive submissions by the parties and the evidence 
admitted at trial, an evidentiary hearing would have been 
superfluous. Further, the issues concerning the amount of expenses 
were, for the most part, resolved by correspondence and meetings 
between the parties in the process of arriving at a stipulation. 
(Record 1039-41). As such, the situation in the instant case does 
not present the situation contemplated in Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc. 
v. Chavez, 565 P.2d 1142, 1143 (Utah 1977). 
Because the trial court primarily and authoritcitively resolved 
the issues, making an additional hearing superfluous, because the 
parties submitted extensive information concerning the issues to the 
court, which it diligently considered, and because the parties 
resolved a majority of the disputed matters by stipulation, the trial 
court did not abuse discretion in allowing Plaintiff to submit 
evidence regarding that amounts claimed and sought at trial. For the 
same reasons, the trial court appropriately exercised its discretion, 
pursuant to Rule 43, in deciding the matters based on the extensive 
submissions and stipulations of the parties. 
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4. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
REFUSING TO MODIFY THE DIVORCE DECREE TO REQUIRE 
DEFENDANT TO PAY AN INCREASED AMOUNT OF CHILD 
SUPPORT. 
In the course of refusing to increase Plaintiff's child support 
obligation by modification, the trial court found that there had not 
been a substantial change in circumstances. (Record at 1055, Finding 
of Fact 7). Such a finding is clearly erroneous, and the court 
abused its discretion in refusing to modify the Decree to require 
Defendant to pay increased child support. 
An appellate court gives "great deference to the trial court's 
findings of fact" and "will not overturn them unless they are clearly 
erroneous." Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465, 467 (Utah App. 1989). In 
challenging the trial court's findings, a party must "marshal the 
evidence which supports the finding[s] and then demonstrate that, 
despite this evidence, they are clearly erroneous." Christensen v. 
Munns, 812 P.2d 69, 73 (Utah App. 1991); accord Riche v. Riche, 784 
P. 2d 465 (Utah App. 1989). The trial court's decision as to 
modification of a divorce decree will not be disturbed absent an 
abuse of discretion. Hagan v. Hagan, 810 P.2d 478, 481 (Utah App. 
1991) (citing Jense v. Jense, 784 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah App. 1989)); 
accord Myers v. Myers, 768 P.2d 979, 984 (Utah App. 1991). 
In accordance with the marshaling requirement, the following 
evidence supports the trial court's finding that there has not been 
a substantial change in circumstances warranting an increase in child 
support: 
1. Evidence that Plaintiff has a minimum gross income of 
$833.00 per month, that she earned a profit of approximately 
$4493.00 in 1990 from her costume business, that she utilized a 
rental write-off of $5400.00 for her home business, and that 
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Plaintiff has the ability to write off substantial expenses from 
her taxes through her business (Record at 1055-56, Finding of 
Fact 7); 
2. Defendant's statement that he was willing to pay child 
support of $300.00 per month, and that he "acknowledged" that 
such amount was higher than the sum calculated under the child 
support guidelines (Record at 1056, Finding of Fact 8);7 
3. The trial court's opinion, as adduced from exhibits and 
testimony of both parties, that evidence at trial did not fully 
reveal the nature and extent of the parties' respective incomes, 
and that, according to the court's judgment, the parties' income 
does not justify a finding of a substantial change of 
circumstances (Record at 1056-57, Finding of Facts 9 and 10). 
Despite the aforementioned evidence, the trial court clearly 
erred in finding that there had not been a substantial change in 
circumstances justifying an increase in child support. The court 
found that Plaintiff, at the time of entry of the original Decree, 
had a gross income of $28,687.24 per year or $2390.60 per month 
(Record at 1055, Finding of Fact 4). In contrast, the court further 
found that Plaintiff, at the time the petition was filed, had an 
income of $10,000.00 per year or $833.00 per month. (Record at 1055, 
Finding of Fact 6). This decrease constitutes over a sixty-five 
percent reduction in income since the time the original Decree was 
entered. As to Defendant's income at the time of the original 
Decree, the court found that he was receiving a disability net income 
of $1600.00. This is in stark contrast to Defendant's tax-free 
disability and Social Security income in excess of $36,351.00 per 
7
 Defendant's acknowledgement was mistaken. Based on a 
calculation using the Child Support Obligation Worksheet set forth in 
Addendum C, Defendant child support obligation exceeds $300.00. 
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year or $3029.26 per month at the time the petition was filed.8 
(Record at 1055, Findings of Fact 4 and 5). The trial court, in 
arriving at its finding regarding a lack of substantial change in 
circumstances, failed to consider the "standard of living and 
situation of the partiesf" the "relative wealth and income of the 
parties," the "ability of the Obligor to earn," or the 
"responsibilities of the obligor and the obligee for the support of 
others." See Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7(2)(a)-(c), and (g). 
Notwithstanding its findings, the trial court erred by not 
imputing additional income to Defendant based on his work history, 
occupation, gualifications, and employment potential. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-45-7.5(6) and (7)(b). Under § 78-45-7.5(7), the trial 
court has to impute income if the court finds that the parent is 
voluntarily underemployed. Such is the case here.9 Therefore, the 
court erred by not imputing additional income to Defendant. Cf. 
Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472, 480 (Utah App. 1991); Proctor v. 
Proctor, 773 P.2d 1389, 1390 n.l (Utah App. 1989); see Argument five 
below. 
In addition to the disparity in the parties' income, a 
substantial change in circumstances has occurred by virtue of the 
additional expenditures by Plaintiff to maintain the minor child, 
8
 Although the court noted that Defendant's disability and 
Social Security income was tax free, it failed to adjust his income 
accordingly so as to accurately reflect the relative tax-free 
benefits on his income. (See Argument #5 Supra). 
9
 Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5( 7) (d), income may not be 
imputed if "a parent if physically . . . disabled to the extent that 
he cannot earn minimum wage." However, as indicated more fully below 
in Argument five, Defendant, can and is able, at the very least, to 
earn minimum wage. 
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Michelle, in private school. These additional expenditures 
constitute a substantial increase over the amount required to 
maintain Michelle in private preschool at the time of the original 
Decree. (Record at 1059; 1135, lines 6-7; 1139, lines 17-19; and 
548-657). Since the original Decree, Plaintiff has also lost both 
her health care benefits and her TWA flight benefits, requiring 
additional expenditures on Michelle's behalf. (Record at 35-39, 41, 
658-720, 1058, and 1126,; Plaintiff's Exhibit 5). 
Based on the foregoing, the trial court clearly erred in finding 
that no substantial change in circumstances had occurred. In 
addition, the foregoing evidence indicates a clear abuse of 
discretion by the trial court in refusing to modify the Decree to 
require Defendant to pay an increased child support. 
5. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 
REFUSING TO IMPUTE ADDITIONAL INCOME TO 
DEFENDANT BASED UPON HIS PAST-EARNINGS HISTORY 
AND LIFESTYLE. 
Plaintiff does not challenge the trial court's findings insofar 
as Defendant's tax-free disability income is concerned. However, the 
trial court, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 7 8-45-7.5(6) and (7), erred 
by not imputing income to Defendant based on employment potential and 
probable earnings as derived from his employment history and 
occupation qualifications. 
The trial court is accorded considerable discretion in adjusting 
the financial interests of divorced parties, and thus the trial 
court's actions in this regard are "entitled to a presumption of 
validity." Cummings v. Cumminas, 821 P.2d 472, 480 (Utah App. 1991) 
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(guoting Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P.2d 1055, 1056 (Utah App. 1987)). 
Notwithstanding this presumption, the trial court's determination 
will be upset on appeal when "the evidence clearly preponderates to 
the contrary" or the appellate court determines that the trial court 
has abused its discretion." Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713, 715 
(Utah App. 1990); Cummings, 821 P.2d at 480. 
According to § 78-45-7.5(6), "Gross income includes income 
imputed to the parent under Subsection (7)." Subsection (7)(a) 
provides that "income may not be imputed to a parent unless . . . a 
hearing is held and a finding made that the parent is voluntarily 
unemployed or underemployed." 
The trial court received evidence concerning Defendant's sources 
of income and whether he was voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. 
(Record at 1243, 1256-58). In light of the uncontroverted evidence 
that Defendant continued to work after obtaining his disability 
(Record at 1243, 1255-58, 1260-62), the court, nevertheless, failed 
to make a finding that Defendant is voluntarily unemployed or 
underemployed. Furthermore, the trial court failed to make a finding 
that Defendant was disabled to the point that he cannot work.10 See 
Erwin v. Erwin, 773 P.2d 847, 848-49 (Utah App. 1989) (discussing how 
"court is reguired to 'find the facts specially' and thus ground its 
decision on findings of fact which resolve the material factual 
uncertainties); Painter v. Painter, 752 P. 2d 907, 909 (Utah App. 
10
 Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(d)(ii) provides that " [i]ncome may 
not be imputed if . . . a parent is physically or mentally disabled 
to the extent he cannot earn minimum wage." The evidence in the 
instant case indicates that Defendant, as shown by his post-
disability work history, clearly has the ability to earn at least 
minimum wage. 
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1988) (holding that "to ensure the court acted within its discretion, 
the facts and reasons for the court's decision must be set forth 
fully in appropriate findings and conclusions"). 
Defendant testified at trial about the various jobs he had held 
since receiving his disability. (Record at 1243, 1255-58, 1260-62). 
Over that period of time, Defendant worked in several security 
officer and security consultant positions.11 (Record at 1260-62). 
As the record indicates, this is not a case where the individual is 
totally disabled or cannot function. Rather, Defendant's post-
disability-determination work history clearly shows that he is able 
to perform various strenuous activities. For example, Defendant 
attended anti-terrorist training schools (Record at 1260), hosted the 
annual Moose Lips Lodge Trout Tournament — which involved strenuous 
hiking, wading, and walking through various rivers, streams, and 
lakes in Montana (Record at 1263), and purchased a house that 
included multiple levels and stairs to climb and over thirty-three 
acres of land. (Record at 1249-52). 
Finally, Defendant's lifestyle supports an inference of 
additional income that the court should have imputed to Defendant's 
gross income. Defendant, at the time of the petition, owned three 
vehicles free and clear, namely, a four-wheel drive truck, a Mercedes 
Benz, and a $53,000.00 Ferrari. (Record at 1239-40). Defendant 
testified that the Ferrari requires a $400.00 per month expenditure 
for maintenance. (Record at 1056). Furthermore, continues to host 
11
 At trial, Defendant admitted that, subsequent to receiving 
his disability, he worked sixteen hours a day, six days a week, for 
two and a half years. (Record at 1243). 
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an annual five-day fishing tournament for approximately 12 to 13 
people (Record at 1263). 
Based upon the evidence, the trial court abused its discretion 
in refusing to impute additional income to Defendant based on his 
employment potential and probable earnings as derived from work 
history, occupation qualifications, prevailing earnings for similar 
positions, and lifestyle. Accordingly, this Court should remand the 
instant case for adequate findings concerning Defendant's voluntary 
unemployment and the extent of his disability. 
6. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO ADJUST 
DEFENDANT'S TAX-FREE INCOME TO REFLECT — FOR 
PURPOSES OF CHILD SUPPORT CALCULATION — A GROSS 
INCOME EQUIVALENT TO A TAXABLE INCOME. 
At trial, Defendant testified that his disability or pension 
income was tax free. (Record at 1231). In order to show the true 
value of Defendant's disability income as related to the calculation 
of child support, Plaintiff, by exhibit, attempted to illustrate how 
the tax-free disability income should be adjusted to compensate for 
its tax-free status and convert it into a taxable gross.12 Plaintiff 
then requested that the trial court take judicial notice of the fact 
that Defendant's income, when multiplied by the applicable tax 
bracket multiplier, reflects Defendant's true taxable gross. (Record 
at 1234). However, the court refused to take judicial notice of the 
"proper application" of the applicable tax factor to Defendant's 
12
 Because the Child Support Guidelines are calculated based on 
a taxable gross, and because Defendant's pension income is tax free, 
Plaintiff, by utilizing the applicable tax brackets in an exhibit, 
converted the tax-free pension income into taxable income. (Record 
at 1231) . 
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pension income. (Record at 1234). The trial court, in so doing, 
erred by refusing to judicially notice at least an approximate 
adjustment of Defendant's tax-free pension income. 
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Evidence 201(b), "[a] judicially 
noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it 
is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of 
the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by 
resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be guestioned." 
Rule 201(d) provides that a "court shall take judicial notice if 
reguested by a party and supplied with the necessary information. 
The trial court's refusal to take judicial notice is reviewed for 
correction of error. See Redevelopment Agency of Roy v. JonesF 743 
P.2d 1233, 1235 (Utah App. 1987). 
In the instant case, the approximate impact of the applicable 
tax factor to Defendant's income is capable of accurate and ready 
determination by resort to sources that cannot reasonably be 
guestioned. Plaintiff not only reguested that the court take 
judicial notice, but she supplied the necessary information for the 
court to do so. (Record at 1233-34). The trial court erred by not 
judicially noticing this fact. 
Even if this Court determines that Plaintiff did not provide the 
court with the necessary information under Rule 201(d), the trial 
court abused its discretion by not at least approximating the tax-
free benefits of the disability income to Defendant under subsection 
(c). Under subsection (c), the trial court, as a matter of eguity, 
should have adjusted Defendant's income in some way to reflect the 
tax-free benefits of his disability income. Under Utah Code Ann. 
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§ 78-45-7.5, the trial court has a responsibility to determine the 
gross income of the parties, which it failed to do. The court's 
refusal to do so, by not adjusting for Defendant's tax-free pension, 
was an abuse of discretion. 
7. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
ADMITTING DEFENDANT'S MEDICAL TESTIMONY WITHOUT 
ANY EXPERT TESTIMONY OR MEDICAL FOUNDATION. 
At trial, Defendant testified that, due to his disability, he 
was unable to work to supplement his disability income. (Record at 
1199-1204). In the process, Defendant testified, without any 
substantiating medical expert testimony, that he suffered from three 
diseases, namely, a thyroid disease, ulcer disease, and heart 
disease. (Record at 1199). In addition, Defendant testified that he 
suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome. (Record at 1201). 
Plaintiff timely objected and moved to strike, but the court admitted 
the testimony. (Record at 1199). The trial court abused its 
discretion in admitting Defendant's testimony without any kind of 
medical foundation. 
"As a general rule, it is within the discretion of the trial 
court to determine . . . whether particular [expert testimony] would 
be helpful and suitable in a particular case." GAW v. State ex re 
Dep't of Trans. , 798 P.2d 1130, 1134 (Utah App. 1990). "The critical 
factor is whether the expert has knowledge that can assist the trier 
of fact in resolving the issues before it." Schindler v. Schindler, 
776 P.2d 84, 89 (Utah App. 1989). 
Here, through evidence presented at trial, Plaintiff showed that 
Defendant had been engaged in several employment positions since 
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receiving his disability* (Record at 1243, 1255-58, 1260-62). 
Defendant admitted that he used these positions of employment to 
supplement his tax-free disability income, (Record at 1255-58). 
Plaintiff also showed that Defendant is not disabled to the extent 
that he cannot work. To the contrary, Defendant regularly engaged in 
strenuous physical activities. (Record 1260, 1262, 1249-52). By 
allowing Defendant to testify concerning his own medical condition, 
without any medical foundation, the trial court allowed Defendant to 
rebut the evidence that he worked to supplement his disability 
income. By so doing, the trial court allowed Defendant to rebut the 
evidence going to his ability to work with self-serving statements 
based on inadmissible hearsay. Such testimony was highly 
prejudicial, contributing to the trial court's refusal to grant an 
increase of child support. Expert testimony would have assisted the 
trial court in determining to what extent Defendant was disabled, 
thereby enabling the court to accurately consider Defendant's income 
and ability to supplement his disability income. 
8. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
ENTERING JUDGMENT AGAINST PLAINTIFF FOR ONE-HALF 
THE COSTS OF TRANSPORTATION FOR DEFENDANT'S 
VISITATION WITH THE MINOR CHILD FROM AND AFTER 
THE DATE OF FILING OF THE AMENDED PETITION TO 
MODIFY THE DECREE OF DIVORCE. 
Plaintiff, as part of her amended petition, sought a 
modification of the stipulated Divorce Decree requiring Defendant to 
pay for visitation transportation expenses. The original California 
Decree required Plaintiff to pay transportation costs for the travel 
of the minor child, Michelle, from Salt Lake City to Los Angeles and 
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back again for visitation with Defendant. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 10, 
p. 12, parag. 4), At that time, Plaintiff, through the benefits of 
her employment with TWA, could provide free air travel for Michelle. 
(Record at 1122). It was the parties' understanding, agreement, and 
contemplation at the time of the divorce settlement that Plaintiff 
would pay for Michelle's visitation transportation "as long as 
[Plaintiff was] employed at TWA and pass benefits remain[ed] the same 
as of the date of the Marital Settlement Agreement." (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 6, p. 2, parag. 3f, Record at 1122-23). Plaintiff's 
employment with TWA subsequently terminated, and Defendant moved from 
Los Angeles to Montana. (Record at 1126). Because Plaintiff's 
obligation to pay visitation transportation expenses ceased upon both 
the termination of her employment with TWA and Defendant's relocation 
to Montana, the trial court abused its discretion in requiring 
Plaintiff to pay one-half of the transportation expenses for 
visitation with Defendant in Montana. 
To obtain modification of a decree, a party must show that there 
has been a substantial change in circumstances subsequent to the 
decree that was not contemplated in the original decree. Woodward v. 
Woodward, 709 P.2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985) (per curiam); Muir v. Muir, 
841 P.2d 736, 739 (Utah App. 1992); Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7 (1992). 
The trial court's modification determination is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. Muir, 841 P.2d at 739. 
In the instant case, the trial court correctly found that there 
had been a substantial change in circumstances regarding the payment 
of transportation expenses. (Record at 1058). Notwithstanding, the 
trial court failed to make adequate findings to support its 
45 
determination that Defendant only pay one-half of the visitation 
transportation expenses. The court abused its discretion in 
requiring Plaintiff to pay one-half of the visitation transportation 
expenses because Defendant, based on Defendant's increase in income 
as compared to Plaintiff's significant decrease in income, is in a 
better position to pay the transportation expenses. Moreover, 
Defendant had the ability to pay. The original California Decree 
requires Plaintiff to provide visitation transportation at a time 
when she, by virtue of her flight benefits with TWA, could do so at 
little or no cost. Furthermore, the trial court failed to recognize 
that, upon Plaintiff's termination of flight benefits, and upon 
Defendant's voluntary move from Los Angeles to Montana, the original 
Decree, together with the requirement that Plaintiff pay for the 
visitation transportation, ended upon its own terms. 
CONCLUSION 
For the aforementioned reasons, this Court should affirm the 
trial court's rulings requiring Defendant to pay one-half of the 
minor child's private school expenses, and that Defendant not be 
allowed to offset his obligation to pay such expenses against the 
minor child's Social Security benefits. Further, the court did not 
abuse its discretion in allowing Plaintiff to submit post-trial 
documentation to clarify and establish amounts sought at trial. 
However, this Court should reverse both the trial court's refusal to 
require Defendant to pay increased child support and the refusal to 
adjust Defendant's tax-free income to reflect a gross income 
equivalent to a taxable gross income. Finally, this Court should 
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reverse the trial court's decision to admit Defendant's medical 
testimony and the trial court's judgment against Plaintiff for one-
half of the visitation transportation expenses. 
Date: Qc\ebfL( H , 1993. 
Randall J, 
Attorney fc 
Appellee anc :o s s-Appe11ant 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JO ANN BROOKS (NUNLEY), ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. .] 
THOMAS M. BROOKS, ] 
Defendant. ] 
) Case No. C 88 4192 
) Judge Richard H. Moffat 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiffs "Amended Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce" and Defendant's 
"Countermotion" came on regularly for trial on the 22nd day of April, 1991 before the 
Honorable Richard H. Moffat. Plaintiff appeared in person and by and through her 
attorney of record, Randall J. Holmgren. Defendant appeared in person and by and 
through his attorney of record, Paul H. Liapis. The Court heard the sworn testimony of 
Plaintiff and Defendant, marked and received documents and exhibits in support of the 
positions of Plaintiff and Defendant, heard arguments of counsel, reviewed the records and 
O C T - 2 1S92 
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files herein and, took the matter under advisement and thereafter issued its Minute Entry 
on the 26th day of April, 1991. 
Following the issuance of said Minute Entry, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for 
Clarification of Ruling and Defendant filed a Countermotion for Attorney Fees. Defendant 
submitted proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the Court on or about June 
3, 1991, and Plaintiff objected to those proposed Findings and Conclusions and submitted 
her own proposed Findings of Fact (with footnotes indicating the portions of the Court's 
April 26, 1991 Minute Entry and Defendant's proposed Findings of Fact needing 
clarification). The Plaintiffs Motion for Clarification and the Defendant's Countermotion 
for Attorney Fees were heard on August 7, 1991. 
The Court entered an Order (Re: Plaintiffs Motion for Clarification of Ruling and 
Defendant's Countermotion for Attorney Fees) on December 3, 1991. In said Order, 
portions of the April 26,1991 Minute Entry were clarified and other portions were reserved 
for further review. In particular, said Order directed Plaintiff to submit a motion and 
supporting memorandum to the Court, pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration, addressing the issues that the Court reserved for further review. The Court 
directed that entry of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Divorce Modification 
Order be delayed until such time as such post-trial motion was submitted and ruled on so 
that the issues thereby resolved, together with the issues clarified by the December 3, 1991 
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Order, could be included in the final Findings, Conclusions, and modification of decree 
Order pertaining to the April 22, 1991. 
On or about November 1, 1991, Plaintiff submitted her "Motion for Post-Trial 
Determination of Divorce Modification Issues," as directed by the Court. The Motion was 
opposed by Defendant. The matter was submitted to the Court in accordance with Rule 4-
501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. The Court issued a Minute Entry ruling 
dated December 19,1991 and entered an "Order (Re: Motion for Post-Trial Determination 
of Divorce Modification Issues)" on January 10, 1992. 
On or about March 6, 1992, upon the request of the Defendant, the Court instructed 
Plaintiff and Defendant to submit an accounting to the Court with respect to the amounts 
expended by Plaintiff on behalf of the parties' minor child, Michelle, for private school, 
tuition, books, uniforms, school supplies and school activities, and medical, dental and 
prescription expenses. Accordingly, on or about May 15, 1992, Defendant submitted 
"Defendant's Response to Accounting Pursuant to Court's Request." On or about May 19, 
1992, Plaintiff submitted "Plaintiffs Response and Objection to 'Defendant's Response to 
Accounting Pursuant to Court's Request'." Pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Rules of 
Judicial Administration, the Court issued a Minute Entry ruling dated July 22, 1992. 
The Court having duly considered the foregoing, incorporates herein its trial ruling 
(i.e., 4/26/91 Minute Entry), its post-trial Orders dated December 3, 1991 and January 10, 
3 
1992, and its Minute Entry dated July 22, 1992, and the Court does now make, adopt and 
find the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff and Defendant were divorced on the 14th day of August, 1985 in the 
State of California pursuant to a written divorce settlement agreement 
2. Plaintiff and Defendant were awarded joint legal and physical custody of the 
minor child, Michelle Nohealani Brooks, now age 11, born September 18, 1980. Plaintiff 
was awarded the primary physical custody of said child and Defendant was awarded 
specified custodial rights with said child, and Plaintiff, JO ANN NUNLEY (BROOKS), was 
ordered to bear the expense of the transportation of the minor child to and from Los 
Angeles, California to visit the Defendant, THOMAS M. BROOKS, during his on-schedule 
custodial period. 
3. The Decree of Divorce required the Defendant to pay to Plaintiff child 
support in the sum of $300.00 per month on the 1st day of each month commencing on the 
1st day of August, 1985, and continuing until the said child reaches the age of eighteen (18), 
joins the armed forces, is fully employed, is married, is emancipated or upon her death. 
Plaintiff was further ordered to pay to Defendant $100.00 per month as child support if the 
minor child resided with the Defendant for sixteen (16) days or more in any month. 
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4. The Court finds that at the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce, the 
Plaintiff was employed with TWA Airlines, with a gross year-end income of $28,687.24, or 
a gross monthly amount of $2,390.60. The Court finds that the Defendant was receiving 
disability income at the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce and, pursuant to the 
Settlement Agreement of the parties, had a net income of $1,600.00 per month. 
5. The Court finds that the Defendant, THOMAS M. BROOKS, has a current 
gross income of $3,029.26 per month. The Court bases this finding on all of the evidence 
submitted at trial, including the evidence that his disability and social security income is tax-
free, and including his income producing capabilities, and the Court believes that the finding 
is based on due consideration of all of the evidence. 
6. The Court finds that the income of the Plaintiff is approximately $10,000.00 
per year (or about $833.00 per month), based upon the stipulated testimony of the Plaintiff 
at trial, and the Court finds that her imputed income should be approximately $833.00 per 
month. The Court did not find evidence to support a finding that Plaintiff was earning more 
than her stipulated income of $10,000.00 per year. 
7. The Court finds that there has not been a substantial and material change of 
circumstances based upon its finding that Plaintiff has a minimum of $833.00 gross per 
month from her costume business, and further that she earned a profit of approximately 
$4,493.00 for the tax year 1990 from her costume business, that she had incorporated into 
her tax return a rental write-off of $5,400.00 while operating this business out of her home, 
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and that the Plaintiff had the ability to write-off substantial amounts of expenses through 
her business, without being required to take money from the business in a taxable form. 
The Court notes that the Defendant claims a $400.00 per month expenditure to maintain 
his Ferrari automobile and that the total of Defendant's checking account deposits for the 
period May 16,1988 through July 17,1990, shows approximately $173,000.00 of deposits and 
$171,000.00 of withdrawals. While there are certain explanations made which could explain 
some of the discrepancy, it certainly did not describe or explain away all of the discrepancy 
as to the Defendant's expenditures. 
8. The Court farther finds that the Defendant stated that he was willing to pay 
child support at the rate of $300.00 per month for his share of the minor child's daily needs, 
and acknowledged that said amount was higher than the sum calculated under the Uniform 
Child Support Worksheet. 
9. The Court is of the opinion that the exhibits and testimony produced by both 
parties at the time of the trial do not fully reveal the nature and extent of their respective 
incomes and, therefore, the Court cannot draw any more specific findings from the evidence 
presented at the time of the trial as to either party's income. 
10. The Court finds from the evidence presented and its additional findings set 
forth above, that Plaintiff and Defendant clearly have additional income which the Court 
has not been able to compute and arrive at a figure for each party. The Court's best 
judgment is that it is at a level which does not justify a finding of a substantial change of 
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material circumstances and, therefore, the child support sum of $300.00 per month should 
be left in place, particularly in view of the Defendant's willingness to keep the child support 
at its current level of $300.00 per month. 
11. For all of the above-said reasons, the Court found that the Plaintiff had failed 
to prove a material and substantial change of circumstances to justify the increase in child 
support sought by the Plaintiff in this matter. 
12. The Court finds, as to the visitation transportation expenses, that the reason 
and basis upon which the original transportation order in this matter was entered (i.e., the 
California Divorce Decree) was that Plaintiff was then employed by TWA airlines and could 
thus provide free transportation, or at least it was contemplated that Plaintiff could provide 
free transportation, for the minor child from Salt Lake City to Defendant's home in Los 
Angeles. The Court further finds that Plaintiff is no longer employed by TWA and cannot 
provide free transportation for the minor child. 
13. The Court notes that Plaintiffs husband (an airline employee) has access to 
passes and/or discount fares for his family. The Court finds that it is willing to find that 
Plaintiff should ask her husband to secure discount tickets for travel of the minor child to 
and from Defendant's visitation. If Plaintiffs husband is willing to do so, Plaintiff should 
then send a photocopy of the front page of the itinerary part of the ticket indicating the 
amount paid, and Defendant is to reimburse Plaintiff for his one-half of that amount one 
(1) week prior to the flight. The Court finds that if Defendant does not reimburse Plaintiff 
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for his one-half, then no visitation should occur. The Court finds that such visitation should 
be agreed upon at least thirty (30) days prior to the scheduled visitation and all parties 
should cooperate to effectuate these arrangements. The Court also finds that if Plaintiffs 
husband if unable to secure such discount tickets or is unwilling to do so, Plaintiff should 
then buy the.tickets and send Defendant a photocopy for reimbursement under the 
conditions set forth above. The Courts finds that the Plaintiff should cooperate in seeing 
that the Defendant has all of the custodial visitation rights he was awarded under the 
California Decree of Divorce. 
14. The Court finds that in addition to the above loss of Plaintiffs TWA benefits 
that the Defendant has moved from Los Angeles, California to Montana and the Court 
finds, in a technical sense, that Plaintiffs responsibihty for payment of transportation for the 
minor child's visit would terminate upon that condition. 
15. Without relying on the technical statement above, the Court is of the opinion 
that clearly the parties contemplated the furnishing of that transportation through Plaintiff 
employment as a perk, at no cost to the Plaintiff, and on that basis, she was willing to 
provide the benefit to the parties. 
16. The Court finds that all of the above constitute a sufficient, substantial and 
material change of circumstances to require each party to share equally the costs of 
transportation for Defendant's visitation until the minor child reaches the age of 18 and 
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graduates from high school during her normal and expected year of graduation or until 
further order of this Court. 
17. The Court finds that Plaintiff should reimburse Defendant for one-half of the 
transportation costs that Defendant has reasonably incurred in exercising his visitation rights 
with the minor child of the parties. Based upon the Court's review of Plaintiffs and 
Defendant's "Response to Accounting Pursuant to Court Request", said expenses total 
$2,534.50 for visitation expenses from NoVember 21, 1988 through March 27, 1991. 
Therefore, Plaintiff should be ordered to pay Defendant for one-half of $2,534.50 or 
$1,267.25 and judgment should enter accordingly. 
18. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has enrolled the minor child in a private 
school, Rowland-Hall St. Mark's, and that she has expended substantial sums of money to 
keep said child in a private school. The Court further finds that both Plaintiff and 
Defendant are desirous for their child to be enrolled in private school. The Court finds that 
the Defendant noted that he did not believe that he had the ability to maintain the costs to 
maintain the minor child in private school. 
19. The Court finds that Plaintiff and Defendant should pay one-half of the 
private school tuition, books, supplies, school activities, and school uniforms from the date 
of Plaintiffs Amended Petition, November 21, 1988, when this issue was first raised by 
Plaintiff, until the child ceases to attend private school or until further order of this Court. 
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20. The Court finds that subsequent to the trial in this matter, Plaintiff presented 
a letter, over the objection of Defendant's counsel, from an employee of the Social Security 
Administration, dated July 12,1991, indicating that the Court could not assign or determine 
how benefits paid to the minor child could be used. The Court was subsequently requested 
by counsel for Plaintiff to permit the filing of a Motion for Post-Trial Determination of this 
social security issue and the Court found that the matter should be submitted to it under 
Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial Administration. Defendant was to respond to that 
Motion within thirty (30) days after filing and no sooner than the 6th of September, 1991. 
21. The Court finds, after review of the matters submitted to it under the "Motion 
for Post-Trial Determination," that contrary to its April 26, 1991 trial Minute Entry, it does 
not have the power to assign the social security auxiliary benefits received by the parties' 
minor child (by reason of Defendant's permanent disability) to meet the Defendant's 
obUgation to pay one-half of the child's private-school expenses. The social security 
auxiliary benefits received by the minor child do not reduce the disability benefits otherwise 
due to or received by the Defendant and, in fact, said auxiliary benefits are for the minor 
child's use only and cannot be judicially assigned or designated for any other use. The 
Court finds that the Defendant should meet his obHgations for one-half of the minor child's 
private school expenses from his own resources and not from the child's social security 
benefits. 
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22. The Court finds, based upon the information provided under the "Motion for 
Post-Trial Determination," and the Court's review of Plaintiffs and Defendant's "Response 
to Accounting Pursuant to Court Request," that the parties have agreed that Plaintiff has 
incurred the sum of $19,160.00 for Michelle's private school expenses which include tuition, 
interest, insurance, books, supplies, school activities and school uniforms from November 
21,1988 through September 16, 1991. The Court finds that Defendant should pay Plaintiff 
one-half of said amount, or $9,580.00, and judgment should enter accordingly. 
23. The Court finds, based upon the information provided under the "Motion for 
Post-Trial Determination," and the Court's review of Plaintiffs and Defendant's "Response 
to Accounting Pursuant to Court Request," that Plaintiff has incurred an additional sum of 
$5,801.38 for Michelle's private school expenses which include school activities, supplies and 
school uniforms. The Court finds that Defendant should pay Plaintiff one-half of said 
amount, or $2,900.69, and judgment should enter accordingly. 
24. The Court further finds that the parties should share equally the cost of such 
expenses that are incurred after September 16,1991 until the child ceases to attend private 
school or until further order of this Court. 
25. The Court finds, based upon the information provided under the "Motion for 
Post-Trial Determination," and the Court's review of Plaintiffs and Defendant's "Response 
to Accounting Pursuant to Court's Request," that the Plaintiff has incurred medical, dental 
and prescription expenses (not covered by insurance) from November 21, 1988 through 
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March 31,1992, for the minor child, Michelle, of $1,157.24. The Court finds that Defendant 
should pay Plaintiff one-half of said amount, or $578.62, and judgment should enter 
accordingly. 
26. The Court finds that the parties should share equally, from March 31, 1992, 
one-half of the insurance deductibles and noncovered medical, dental and prescription 
expenses for the minor child, Michelle, until she attains the age of eighteen (18) and has 
graduated from high school during her normal and expected year of graduation or until 
further order of this Court. 
27. The Court finds that while the extracurricular activities of the minor child as 
shown on Plaintiffs trial Exhibit 5, may be advantageous to the minor child and may be 
desirable, the Court finds that the Defendant should not be obHgated to pay one-half of 
those expenses. 
28. The Court finds that it has no intention at this point in ruling that Plaintiff is 
at risk to return Michelle's benefits to social security if it is subsequently determined that 
the Defendant is not legally disabled. 
29. The Court finds that the amounts awarded to Plaintiff and against Defendant 
by way of judgment (in parag. 22 above) for the minor child's private school tuition, books, 
supplies, school activities and school uniforms is $12,480.69. Defendant's one-half share of 
Michelle's medicals is $578.62. The total of $13,059.31 should be reduced by the judgment 
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entered against Plaintiff for reimbursement of visitation transportation costs of $1,267.25, 
leaving a judgment owing in Plaintiffs favor against Defendant in the sum of $11,792.06. 
30. The Court has taken into consideration the earning capability and the income 
level of the Defendant in determining the obligations he is to pay on behalf of the parties' 
minor child. The Court finds that Defendant has the ability to pay the obligations imposed 
herein. 
31. The Court finds that both Plaintiff and Defendant have incurred attorneys' 
fees in this matter. The Court finds that neither of the parties are entitled to an award of 
attorney's fees from the other and that each should bear their own expenses and fees. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and adopts the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiffs Petition to increase child support for the minor child, should be 
denied. 
2. The prior order of support established by the California Court requiring 
Defendant to pay to Plaintiff $300.00 per month as child support should remain in full force 
and effect. 
3. A substantial and material change of circumstances has occurred with the 
Defendant's move to the State of Montana and the Plaintiffs loss of travel benefits from her 
former employer, TWA Airlines. The prior custodial visitation order that Plaintiff pay all 
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transportation costs should be amended to require each of the parties to share equally, at 
the best available rate, all of the costs of transportation for the child from Utah to 
Defendant's residence until the minor child reaches the age of 18 and graduates from high 
school during her normal and expected year of graduation or until further order of this 
Court. Plaintiff should be ordered to ask her husband (an airline employee) to secure 
discount tickets for travel of the minor child to and from Defendant's visitation. If Plaintiffs 
husband is willing to do so, Plaintiff should then send a photocopy of the front page of the 
itinerary part of the ticket indicating the amount paid, and Defendant is to reimburse 
Plaintiff for his one-half of that amount one (1) week prior to the flight. If Defendant does 
not reimburse Plaintiff for his one-half, at least one (1) week prior to the flight, then no 
visitation should occur. Such visitation should be agreed upon at least thirty (30) days prior 
to the scheduled visitation and all parties should cooperate to effectuate these arrangements. 
If Plaintiffs husband if unable to secure such discount tickets or is unwilling to do so, 
Plaintiff should then buy the tickets and send Defendant a photocopy for reimbursement 
under the conditions set forth above. The parties should cooperate in seeing that the 
Defendant has all of the custodial visitation rights he was awarded under the California 
Decree of Divorce. 
4. Defendant should be awarded judgment against Plaintiff for one-half of those 
amounts incurred by the Defendant for transportation costs to accomplish his visitation from 
November 21, 1988 through March 27, 1991 in the sum of $1,267.25. 
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5. Plaintiff should be awarded a judgment against the Defendant for his share 
of the minor child's private school tuition, interest, insurance, books, fees, uniforms and 
school activities in the sum of $9,580.00 from November 21, 1988 through September 16, 
1991. 
6. Plaintiff should be awarded a judgment against the Defendant for his share 
of the minor child's additional private school activities, supplies and school uniforms in the 
sum of $2,900.69 from November 21, 1988 through September 16, 1991. 
7. Plaintiff should be awarded a judgment against the Defendant for his share 
of the minor child's medical, dental and prescription expenses in the sum of $578.62 from 
November 21, 1988 through March 31, 1992. 
8. The judgment awarded to Defendant above of $1,267.25 is to be applied 
toward the three (3) judgments awarded to Plaintiff, totalling $13,059.31, leaving a new 
amount in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant in the sum of $11,792.06. 
9. Plaintiff and Defendant should pay one-half of the minor child's private school 
tuition, books, supplies, school activities and school uniforms from September 16,1991 until 
the child ceases to attend private school or until further order of this Court. 
10. On the social security issue, the Court hereby amends its prior ruling in its 
Minute Entry of April 26, 1991 and awards all amounts that have been paid to the minor 
child, Michelle, as her benefits under the social security auxiliary benefits received (due to 
Defendant's permanent disability) to the minor child as her proceeds, and the same are not 
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to be credited toward any amount of support for the minor child by Defendant or to cover 
her private school costs, 
11. The parties should share equally, from March 31, 1992, one-half of the 
insurance deductibles and noncovered medical, dental and prescription expenses for the 
minor child, Michelle, until she attains the age of eighteen (18) and has graduated from high 
school during her normal and expected year of graduation or until further order of this 
Court. 
12. The Defendant should not be obligated to pay one-half of the minor child's 
extracurricular activities. 
13. The Court makes no ruling with regard to Plaintiffs risk to return Michelle's 
benefits to social security if it is subsequently determined that the Defendant is not legally 
disabled. 
14. The Court has taken into consideration the earning capability and the income 
level of the Defendant in determining Defendant's obligations on behalf of the parties' 
minor child. Defendant has the ability to pay the obligations imposed herein. 
15. Neither Plaintiff nor Defendant should be awarded any attorneys' fee or costs 
in this matter, and each should assume and pay their own fees incurred. 
16. All remaining provisions of the California Order not amended, modified or 
altered by this Order should remain in full force and effect. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I personally caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, postage prepaid, to the following, on 
this 2£)_ day of S q ^ r * 19<?Z^ 
Paul H. Liapis 
Liapis, Gray, Stegall & Green 
New York Building, #300 
48 Post Office Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
OjO-^- i l_ W/> 
Laura L. Hoins 
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RANDALL J. HOLMGREN, #4054 
Attorney at Law 
The Valley Tower, Suite 1111 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone (801) 328-4333 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JO ANN BROOKS (NUNLEY), ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
THOMAS M. BROOKS, ] 
Defendant. ] 
• 
! i-ri i o i & 
\ Case No. C 88 4192 
) Judge Richard H. Moffat 
ORDER MODIFYING DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Plaintiffs "Amended Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce" and Defendant's 
"Countermotion" came on regularly for trial on the 22nd day of April, 1991 before the 
Honorable Richard H. Moffat. Plaintiff appeared in person and by and through her 
attorney of record, Randall J. Holmgren. Defendant appeared in person and by and 
through his attorney of record, Paul H. Liapis. The Court heard the sworn testimony of 
Plaintiff and Defendant, marked and received documents and exhibits in support of the 
positions of Plaintiff and Defendant, heard arguments of counsel, reviewed the records and 
OCT - 2 ISS: 
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files herein and, took the matter under advisement and thereafter issued its Minute Entry 
on the 26th day of April, 1991. 
Following the issuance of said Minute Entry, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for 
Clarification of Ruling and Defendant filed a Countermotion for Attorney Fees. Defendant 
submitted proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the Court on or about June 
3, 1991, and Plaintiff objected to those proposed Findings and Conclusions and submitted 
her own proposed Findings of Fact (with footnotes indicating the portions of the Court's 
April 26, 1991 Minute Entry and Defendant's proposed Findings of Fact needing 
clarification). The Plaintiffs Motion for Clarification and the Defendant's Countermotion 
for Attorney Fees were heard on August 7, 1991. 
The Court entered an Order (Re: Plaintiffs Motion for Clarification of Ruling and 
Defendant's Countermotion for Attorney Fees) on December 3, 1991. In said Order, 
portions of the April 26,1991 Minute Entry were clarified and other portions were reserved 
for further review. In particular, said Order directed Plaintiff to submit a motion and 
supporting memorandum to the Court, pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration, addressing the issues that the Court reserved for further review. The Court 
directed that entry of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Divorce Modification 
Order be delayed until such time as such post-trial motion was submitted and ruled on so 
that the issues thereby resolved, together with the issues clarified by the December 3,1991 
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Order, could be included in the final Findings, Conclusions, and modification of decree 
Order pertaining to the April 22, 1991. 
On or about November 1, 1991, Plaintiff submitted her "Motion for Post-Trial 
Determination of Divorce Modification Issues," as directed by the Court. The Motion was 
opposed by Defendant. The matter was submitted to the Court in accordance with Rule 4-
501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administrajion. The Court issued a Minute Entry ruling 
dated December 19,1991 and entered an "Order (Re: Motion for Post-Trial Determination 
of Divorce Modification Issues)" on January 10, 1992. 
On or about March 6,1992, upon the request of the Defendant, the Court instructed 
Plaintiff and Defendant to submit an accounting to the Court with respect to the amounts 
expended by Plaintiff on behalf of the parties' minor child, Michelle, for private school, 
tuition, books, uniforms, school supplies and school activities, and medical, dental and 
prescription expenses. Accordingly, on or about May 15, 1992, Defendant submitted 
"Defendant's Response to Accounting Pursuant to Court's Request." On or about May 19, 
1992, Plaintiff submitted "Plaintiffs Response and Objection to 'Defendant's Response to 
Accounting Pursuant to Court's Request'." Pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Rules of 
Judicial Administration, the Court issued a Minute Entry ruling dated July 22, 1992. 
The Court having duly considered the foregoing, incorporates herein its trial ruling 
(i.e., 4/26/91 Minute Entry), its post-trial Orders dated December 3,1991 and January 10, 
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1992, and its Minute Entry dated July 22, 1992, and the Court having entered its written 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Plaintiffs Petition to increase child support for the minor child is hereby 
denied. 
2. The prior order of support established by the California Court requiring 
Defendant to pay to Plaintiff $300.00 per month as child support will remain in full force 
and effect. 
3. A substantial and material change of circumstances has occurred with the 
Defendant's move to the State of Montana and the Plaintiffs loss of travel benefits from her 
former employer, TWA Airlines. The prior custodial visitation order that Plaintiff pay all 
transportation costs is hereby amended to require each of the parties to share equally, at 
the best available rate, all of the costs of transportation for the child from Utah to 
Defendant's residence until the minor child reaches the age of 18 and graduates from high 
school during her normal and expected year of graduation or until further order of this 
Court. Plaintiff is ordered to ask her husband (an airline employee) to secure discount 
tickets for travel of the minor child to and from Defendant's visitation. If Plaintiff s husband 
is willing to do so, Plaintiff shall then send a photocopy of the front page of the itinerary 
part of the ticket indicating the amount paid, and Defendant is to reimburse Plaintiff for his 
one-half of that amount one (1) week prior to the flight. If Defendant does not reimburse 
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Plaintiff for his one-half, at least one (1) week prior to the flight, then no visitation will 
occur. Visitation will be agreed upon at least thirty (30) days prior to the scheduled 
visitation and all parties will cooperate to effectuate these arrangements. If Plaintiffs 
husband if unable to secure such discount tickets or is unwilling to do so, Plaintiff shall then 
buy the tickets and send Defendant a photocopy for reimbursement under the conditions 
set forth above. The parties are ordered to will cooperate in seeing that the Defendant has 
all of the custodial visitation rights he was awarded under the California Decree of Divorce. 
4. Defendant be and he is hereby awarded judgment against Plaintiff for one-half 
of those amounts incurred by the Defendant for transportation costs to accomplish his 
visitation from November 21, 1988 through March 27, 1991 in the sum of $1,267.25. 
5. Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded a judgment against the Defendant for 
his share of the minor child's private school tuition, interest, insurance, books, fees, uniforms 
and school activities in the sum of $9,580.00 from November 21, 1988 through September 
16, 1991. 
6. Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded a judgment against the Defendant for 
his share of the minor child's additional private school activities, supplies and uniforms in 
the sum of $2,900.69 from November 21, 1988 through September 16, 1991. 
7. Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded a judgment against the Defendant for 
his share of the minor child's medical, derital and prescription expenses in the sum of 
$578.62 from November 21, 1988 through March 31, 1992. 
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8. The judgment awarded to Defendant above of $1,267.25 is to be applied 
toward the three (3) judgments awarded to Plaintiff, totalling $13,05931, leaving a new 
judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant in the sum of $11,792.06. 
9. Plaintiff and Defendant are hereby ordered to pay one-half of the minor 
child's private school tuition, books, supplies, school activities and school uniforms from 
September 16, 1991 until the child ceases to attend private school or until further order of 
this Court. 
10. On the social security issue, the Court orders that the amounts paid to the 
minor child, Michelle, as her benefits under the social security auxiliary benefits received 
(due to Defendant's permanent disability) are the minor child's and the same are not to be 
credited toward any amount of support for the minor child by Defendant or to cover her 
private school costs. 
11. The parties are hereby ordered to share equally, from March 31, 1992, one-
half of the insurance deductibles and noncovered medical, dental and prescription expenses 
for the minor child, Michelle, until she attains the age of eighteen (18) and has graduated 
from high school during her normal and expected year of graduation or until further order 
of this Court. 
12. The Defendant is not obligated to pay one-half of the minor child's 
extracurricular activities. 
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13. The Court makes no ruling with regard to Plaintiffs risk to return Michelle's 
benefits to social security if it is subsequently determined that the Defendant is not legally 
disabled. 
14. The Court has taken into consideration the earning capability and the income 
level of the Defendant in determining Defendant's obligations on behalf of the parties' 
minor child. Defendant has the ability to pay the obligations imposed herein. 
15. Neither Plaintiff nor Defendant shall be awarded any attorneys' fee or costs 
in this matter, and each shall assume and pay their own fees incurred. 
16. All remaining provisions of the California Order not amended, modified or 
altered by this Order should remain in full force and effect. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I personally caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Order Modifying Decree of Divorce, postage prepaid, to the following, on this 3Q 
day of < ^ c ^ . 19^L. 
Paul H. Liapis 
Liapis, Gray, Stegall & Green 
New York Building, #300 
48 Post Office Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
^.-Uo 
Laura L. Hoins 
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533 JUDICIAL CODE 78-45-7.5 
78-45-7.2. Application of guidelines — Rebuttal. 
(1) The guidelines apply to any judicial or adminis-
trative order establishing or modifying an award of 
child support entered on or after July 1, 1989. 
(2) (a) The child support guidelines shall be ap-
plied as a rebuttable presumption in establishing 
or modifying the amount of temporary or perma-
nent child support. 
(b) The rebuttable presumption means the pro-
visions and considerations required by the guide-
lines and the award amounts resulting from the 
application of the guidelines are presumed to be 
correct, unless rebutted under the provisions of 
this section. 
(3) A written finding or specific finding on the 
record supporting the conclusion that complying with 
a provision of the guidelines or ordering an award 
amount resulting from use of the guidelines would be 
unjust, inappropriate, or not in the best interest of a 
child in a particular case is sufficient to rebut the 
presumption in that case. 
(4) (a) Natural or adoptive children of either par-
ent who live in the home of that parent and are 
not children in common to both parties may at 
the option of either party be taken into account 
under the guidelines in setting or modifying a 
child support award, as provided in Subsection 
(5). 
(b) Additional worksheets shall be prepared 
that compute the obligations of the respective 
parents for the additional children. The obliga-
tions shall then be subtracted from the appropri-
ate parent's income before determining the 
award in the instant case. 
(5) In a proceeding to modify an existing award, 
consideration of natural or adoptive children other 
than those in common to both parties may be applied 
to mitigate an increase in the award, but may not be 
applied to justify a decrease in the award. 
(6) With regard to child support orders, enactment 
of the guidelines and any subsequent change in the 
guidelines constitutes a substantial or material 
change of circumstances as a ground for modification 
of a court order, if there is a difference of at least 25% 
between the existing order and the guidelines. With 
regard to IV-D cases, the office may request modifica-
tion, in accordance with the requirements of the Fam-
ily Support Act of 1988, Public Law 100-485, no more 
often than once every three years. 1990 
78-45-7.3. Procedure — Documentat ion — Stip-
ulation. 
(1) In a default or uncontested proceeding, the 
moving party shall submit: 
(a) a completed child support worksheet; 
(b) the financial verification required by Sub-
section 78-45-7.5(5); and 
(c) a written statement indicating whether or 
not the amount of child support requested is con-
sistent with the guidelines. 
(2) (a) If the documentation of income required un-
der Subsection (1) is not available, a verified rep-
resentation of the defaulting party's income by 
the moving party, based on the best evidence 
available, may be submitted. 
(b) The evidence shall be in affidavit form and 
may only be offered after a copy has been pro-
vided to the defaulting party in accordance with 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or Title 63, Chap-
ter 46b, the Administrative Procedures Act, in an 
administrative proceeding. 
(3) (a) In a stipulated proceeding, one of the mov-
ing parties shall submit: 
(i) a completed child support worksheet; 
(ii) the financial verification required by 
Subsection 78-45-7.5(5); and 
(iii) a written statement indicating 
whether or not the amount of child support 
requested is consistent with the guidelines. 
(b) A hearing is not required, but the guide-
lines shall be used to review the adequacy of a 
child support order negotiated by the parents. 
(c) A stipulated amount for child support or 
combined child support and alimony is adequate 
under the guidelines if the stipulated child sup-
port amount or combined amount exceeds the 
total child support award required by the guide-
lines. When the stipulated amount exceeds the 
guidelines, it may be awarded without a finding 
under Section 78-45-7.2. 1990 
78-45-7.4. Obligation — Adjusted gross income 
used. 
Adjusted gross income shall be used in calculating 
each parent's share of the child support award. Only 
income of the natural or adoptive parents of the child 
may be used to determine the award under these 
guidelines. 1989 
78-45-7.5. Determinat ion of gross income — Im-
puted income. 
(1) As used in the guidelines "gross income" in-
cludes: 
(a) prospective income from any source, in-
cluding nonearned sources, except under Subsec-
tion (3); and 
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, 
royalties, bonuses, rents, gifts from anyone, 
prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, inter-
est, trust income, alimony from previous mar-
riages, annuities, capital gains, social security 
benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unem-
ployment compensation, disability insurance 
benefits, and payments from "nonmeans-tested" 
government programs. 
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited 
to the equivalent of one full-time job. 
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are: 
(a) Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC); 
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy 
program, the Job Training Partnership Act, 
S.S.I., Medicaid, Food Stamps, or General Assis-
tance; and 
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits 
received by a parent. 
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or oper-
ation of a business shall be calculated by 
subtracting necessary expenses required for self-
employment or business operation from gross re-
ceipts. The income and expenses from self-em-
ployment or operation of a business shall be re-
viewed to determine an appropriate level of gross 
income available to the parent to satisfy a child 
support award. Only those expenses necessary to 
allow the business to operate at a reasonable 
level may be deducted from gross receipts. 
(b) Gross income determined under this sub-
section may differ from the amount of business 
income determined for tax purposes. 
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be 
computed on an annual basis and then recalcu-
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lated to determine the average gross monthly in-
come. 
(b) Each parent shall provide suitable docu-
mentation of current earnings, including year-to-
date pay stubs or employer statements. Each par-
ent shall supplement documentation of current 
earnings with copies of tax returns from at least 
the most recent year to provide verification of 
earnings over time and shall document income 
from nonearned sources according to the source. 
Verification of income from records maintained 
by the Office of Employment Security may be 
substituted for employer statements and income 
tax returns. 
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be 
used to determine whether an underemployment 
or overemployment situation exists. 
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the 
parent under Subsection (7). 
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent un-
less the parent stipulates to the amount imputed 
or a hearing is held and a finding made that the 
parent is voluntarily unemployed or underem-
ployed. 
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the in-
come shall be based upon employment potential 
and probable earnings as derived from work his-
tory, occupation qualifications, and prevailing 
earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in 
the community. 
(c) If a parent has no recent work history, in-
come shall be imputed at least at the federal min-
imum wage for a 40-hour work week. To impute 
a greater income, the judge in a judicial proceed-
ing or the presiding officer in an administrative 
proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as 
to the evidentiary basis for the imputation. 
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the 
following conditions exist: 
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for 
the parents' minor children approach or 
equal the amount of income the custodial 
parent can earn; 
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally dis-
abled to the extent he cannot earn minimum 
wage; 
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occu-
pational training to establish basic job skills; 
or 
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs 
of a child require the custodial parent's pres-
ence in the home. 
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings 
of a child who is the subject of a child support 
award, nor benefits to a child in the child's own 
right, such as Supplemental Security Income. 
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child 
due to the earnings of a parent may be credited 
as child support to the parent upon whose earn-
ing record it is based, by crediting the amount 
against the potential obligation of that parent. 
Other unearned income of a child may be consid-
ered as income to a parent depending upon the 
circumstances of each case. 1990 
78-45-7.6. Adjusted gross income. 
(1) As used in the guidelines, "adjusted gross in-
come" is the amount calculated by subtracting from 
gross income alimony previously ordered and paid 
and child support previously ordered. 
(2) The guidelines do not reduce the total child 
support award by adjusting the gross incomes of the 
parents for alimony ordered in the pending proceed-
ing. In establishing alimony, the court shall consider 
that in determining the child support, the guidelines 
do not provide a deduction from gross income for ali-
mony. 1989 
78-45-7.7. Calculation of obligations. 
(1) The parents' child support obligation shall be 
divided between them in proportion to their adjusted 
gross incomes. 
(2) Except in cases of joint physical custody and 
split custody as defined in Section 78-45-2, the total 
child support award shall be determined as follows: 
(a) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the 
parents and determine the base combined child 
support obligation using the base child support 
obligation table. 
(b) Calculate each parent's proportionate 
share of the base combined child support obliga-
tion by multiplying the combined child support 
obligation by each parent's percentage of com-
bined adjusted gross income, and subtracting 
from the products the children's portion of any 
monthly payments made directly by each parent 
for medical and dental insurance premiums. 
(c) Allocate monthly work-related child care 
costs equally to each parent. 
(d) Calculate the total child support award by 
adding the noncustodial parent's share of the 
base child support obligation calculated in Sub-
section (2Kb) and the amount allocated in Sub-
section (2)(c). Include in the order both amounts 
and the total child support award. 
(3) The base combined child support obligation ta-
ble provides combined child support obligations for up 
to ten children. For more than ten children, addi-
tional amounts shall be added to the base child sup-
port obligation shown. The amount shown on the ta-
ble is the support amount for the total number of 
children, not an amount per child. 1990 
78-45-7.8. Split custody — Obligation calcula-
tions. 
In cases of split custody, the total child support 
award shall be determined as follows: 
(1) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the 
parents and determine the base combined child 
support obligation using the base child support 
obligation table. Allocate a portion of the calcu-
lated amount between the parents in proportion 
to the number of children for whom each parent 
has physical custody. The amounts so calculated 
are a tentative base child support obligation due 
each parent from the other parent for support of 
the child or children for whom each parent has 
physical custody. 
(2) Multiply the tentative base child support 
obligation due each parent by the percentage 
that the other parent's adjusted gross income 
bears to the total combined adjusted gross income 
of both parents. 
(3) Subtract from the products in Subsection 
(2) the children's portion of any monthly pay-
ments made directly by each parent for medical 
and dental insurance premiums. 
(4) Subtract the lesser amount in Subsection 
(3) from the larger amount to determine the base 
child support award to be paid by the parent with 
the greater financial obligation. 
(5) Allocate combined monthly work-related 
child care costs equally to each parent. 
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